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Introduction
On the final day of its 1989 session, the New York State Legisla-
ture passed a bill that, with subsequent approval by Governor
Mario Cuomo, would initiate a process for the Borough of Staten
Island to secede from New York City and establish itself as a sepa-
rate municipality.' The bill called for an initial referendum to be
held on Staten Island in November 1990 to consider whether the
voters sought to move forward in the secession process. 2 Upon ap-
proval by the voters, a State Commission would be appointed to
study the issue and write a charter for the new city. A second refer-
endum would be held on Staten Island in November 1993 for the
voters to approve the charter and implicitly express their desire to
secede. If the charter were adopted, the Commission had ninety
days to present the Governor and the legislature with a bill that
would effectuate Staten Island's separation from New York City.
Such legislation would have to pass both houses of the legislature
and be signed by the Governor before a new city could be
incorporated.4
Immediately after the passage of the secession law, New York
Mayor Edward Koch instructed his counsel to file suit in state court
in an attempt to stop the first referendum. City attorneys launched
a two-pronged legal attack.5 First, they argued on federal constitu-
tional grounds that by limiting the secession referenda to the voters
of Staten Island, the procedure had denied equal protection to the
voters of the other boroughs. Second, they claimed that by placing
1. 1989 New York Laws 3291, ch. 773, as amended, 1990 New York Laws 22, ch.
17. Staten Island is the smallest of five boroughs that make up New York City. The
others are the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens and Manhattan. These boroughs correspond
to five state counties that respectively include Richmond, Bronx, Kings, Queens and
New York.
2. The ballot question read: "Should the borough of Staten Island separate from
the City of New York to become the City of Staten Island."
3. The referendum actually posed two questions: (1) Shall the charter for the city
of Staten Island proposed by the charter commission for the city of Staten Island be
adopted?; (2) Provided that the greatest number of votes cast in said election by vot-
ers of the borough of Staten Island are cast in the negative, shall such charter commis-
sion continue in existence for the purpose of drafting an alternative proposed charter
for the city of Staten Island?
4. The original bill, approved by both houses of the legislature in 1989, would not
have required legislative approval after the second referendum in order for secession
to occur. 1989 New York Laws 3291, ch. 773.
5. See Brief for the Appellant, City of New York v. State of New York, 76 N.Y.2d
479, 562 N.E.2d 118, 561 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1990).
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final discretion on the matter with the State Legislature, the law
had violated the home rule provisions of the New York State
Constitution.
In September 1990, the State Court of Appeals affirmed two
lower court decisions upholding the constitutionality of the seces-
sion legislation.6 Federal claims were dismissed, and both the trial
court and the intermediate appellate court found that no home rule
message is required because the legislature has plenary power to
create governments and determine boundary questions.7 The
Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, chose not to address
the home rule issue directly. It found that since the referendum in
question was only advisory in nature, not resulting in the separa-
tion of Staten Island from New York City, there was no need to
determine at that time how the matter would finally be disposed.
The initial referendum passed with an approval rate of 83% of
the Staten Island voters. In February 1991, Governor Cuomo
swore in a thirteen member Charter Commission that is chaired by
State Senator John Marchi, the senior legislator from the island.
The panel, as prescribed in the law, is comprised of five Staten Is-
land legislators, five of their respective appointees, and one ap-
pointee each of the Governor, the Speaker of the Assembly and
the President Pro Tern of the Senate. 8 In November 1993, a second
referendum was put before the people of Staten Island that was
approved by 65% of the voters.
On March 1, 1994, the Commission, in accord with its legislative
mandate, submitted a bill in both houses of the legislature that
would create a new City of Staten Island apart from New York.'
The next day, Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver announced, on the
advice of his Home Rule Counsel, that he could not bring the bill
up for consideration in his house without first receiving a home
rule message from the City of New York.10 Because both the
6. City of New York v. State of New York, 562 N.E.2d. 118, 120 (1990).
7. City of New York v. State of New York, 557 N.Y.S.2d 914, 917 (A.D. 1 Dept.
1990), aff'g 556 N.Y.S.2d 823, 827 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
8. The original members of the Commission were Senator John Marchi (Chair),
Assemblywoman Elizabeth Connelly (Vice-Chair), Allen Cappelli, Senator Martin
Connor, Paul Henry, John Lavelle, Martin Lubin, Francis Powers, Paul Proske,
Kathryn Rooney, Assemblyman Robert Straniere, Richard Thomas and Assembly-
man Eric Vitaliano. Senator Connor was replaced by Senator Christopher Mega on
January 1, 1993 as a result of redistricting. Senator Mega left in July of 1993 to take a
seat on the bench, and was subsequently replaced by Senator Robert DiCarlo.
9. New York State S.6820, A.9662.
10. Carl Campanile & Craig Schneider, Assembly Invokes Rule Blocking Secession
Vote, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE, Mar. 4, 1994, at Al.
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Speaker of the New York City Council, Peter Vallone, and Mayor
Rudolph Guiliani had already expressed their opposition to seces-
sion,11 the prospect for receiving such a request was highly
improbable.
The action by the Speaker led to an outpouring of high profile
legal commentary and debate. The Counsel to the Governor is-
sued a memorandum stating that a home rule message was not re-
quired in order for the legislature to act.12 The Corporation
Counsel for New York City prepared an opinion for the Mayor
arguing that a home rule request was necessary under the State
Constitution.13 In the spring of 1994, the three members of the
Assembly from Staten Island, all of whom were Commission mem-
bers, initiated a lawsuit against the Speaker. 4 The petitioners
claimed that the Speaker's action was an unconstitutional delega-
tion of legislative power to New York City.
The case was dismissed by a trial court on January 17, 1995.15
Citing the separation of powers principle, Judge Robert Williams
ruled that the question of whether a home rule message should be
received before a bill can be reported out of committee is a legisla-
tive matter not subject to judicial review.' 6 He did not decide on
the issue of home rule. The case is now under appeal. In the
meantime, a secession bill has been proposed and passed in the
Senate without any impediments put in its way over the home rule
question.17 The new governor, George Pataki, has pledged to sign
it.
The Staten Island secession case, the most significant in Ameri-
can urban history, raises several important questions regarding the
process of how a territory might detach itself from an established
11. Judy L. Randall, A Mayor Who Just Keeps Giving .. .But Secession is Not in His
Bag of Gifts for the Island, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE, March 28,1994; Reginald Pat-
rick, Vallone Finds Fault With Secession, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE, May 12,1993;
Carl Campanile & Craig Schneider, Vallone to Island on Home Rule: Forget About It!
STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE, March 23, 1994.
12. Elizabeth D. Moore, MEMORANDUM TO THE GOVERNOR ON THE SUBJECT OF
STATEN ISLAND SECESSION, March 10, 1994.
13. Paul A. Crotty, Opinion No.: 2-94, undated.
14. The suit was initiated by Robert Straniere, who was later joined by Eric
Vitaliano and Elizabeth Connelly. Mr. Straniere's counsel Raymond Fasano served as
attorney for the petitioners.
15. Straniere et al. v. Silver, Index No. 3213-94, January 17, 1995.
16. Id
17. Senate bill S. 3781 was passed by a vote of 36-17 on April 12, 1995. S. 3781,
104TH CONo., 1ST SESS. (1995); Carl Campanile, Senate OK's Secession, STATEN IS-
LAND ADVANCE, April 13, 1995, at Al. Companion bill A. 6436 was introduced in the
Assembly, but no action has been taken on it. Id.
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city and set up its own government. The first question involves
who should decide. Specifically, the matter at hand concerns
whether the State Legislature has power to determine the issue
without seeking a home rule request from the jurisdiction whose
boundaries would be altered. This article argues that, based on
precedents established in case law, the state legislature does have
the plenary power to act and that, based upon more fundamental
principles of liberal democracy, these precedents should not be
overturned.
A second, more profound question surrounding the issue of mu-
nicipal secession has not yet become part of the public dialogue:
assuming that the state legislature may eventually have to deal with
the merits of a secession plea, what criteria should be applied in its
deliberations? This is a more difficult problem to address because
there is no substantial body of case law on municipal secession.
However, given the fact that appeals for independence from ex-
isting local governments have become more common in the last
decade,' 8 there is a need to develop criteria that will allow for fair
and responsible decision making. This issue is also addressed.
Most of the literature extant on the subject of secession is found
in the field of international jurisprudence. While such scholarship
is instructive, it does not fully address the issue in the context of
state and local government. To do so, one must conduct a more
comprehensive examination of the history and meaning of city gov-
ernment in the United States. This Article demonstrates how is-
sues of constitutionalism that mitigate against secession in an
international sphere are resolved in the context of American feder-
alism. It is intended that the standards for review developed in this
analysis will have general applicability to other cases of municipal
secession. One cannot appreciate the inherent irony involved in
juxtaposing home rule and secession without understanding basic
precepts from which they were both sprung, namely, popular sov-
ereignty and community.
This Article suggests a uniform standard by which domestic leg-
islatures may decide current and future secession cases. Because
Staten Island is an invaluable analytical tool, the Article will apply
18. Attempts at secession have occurred in Boston, Dallas, and San Francisco, but
none have advanced so far as the Staten Island case. Regional movements are evi-
dent in California, Florida, Louisiana, Idaho, and Indiana. See Elizabeth Niendorf,
The Sweet Smell of Secession, 7 GOVERNINo 22-23 (1993). An interesting case oc-
curred in Boston, where a black community in Roxbury sought to secede and set up
its own city. See Roger House, Mandela Referendum: Blacks in Boston Seek to Se-
cede, 247 THE NATION 452-56 (1988).
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this uniform standard to Staten Island's proposed secession. Part I
discusses the philosophical and legal foundations of the Home
Rule principle and its relationship to secession. Part II considers
secession as a political and legal concept, its underpinnings and the
moral arguments on both sides of secession debates. Part III sug-
gests a unified standard by which legislatures may consider seces-
sion attempts; and Part IV applies this standard to our prototypical
Staten Island case. The article concludes that if the New York
State legislature were to apply these uniform criteria to review the
Staten Island case, it would approve secession.
I. Philosophical and Legal Foundations of the Home Rule
Principle
A. Notions of Democracy
1. Autonomous Cities
Western scholars trace the idea of local autonomy to the city
states of ancient Greece or Renaissance Italy. 9 It is an impressive
legacy. Athenian democracy thrived for nearly a thousand years,
as did the Venetian Republic. Michael Libonati traces the first
treatise on local government to a thirteenth century Florentine
writer by the name of Brunetto Latini.2°
Americans discover a more direct lineage to their local govern-
ments in the towns of medieval England. Gerald Frug describes
these entities as complex political, economic and communal as-
sociations created by merchants to avoid jurisdictional claims from
English nobility.21 The English township was both a product of,
and an instrument for, commercial power. The legal autonomy it
attained went hand in hand with the town's economic strength and
independence. The mercantile class considered local autonomy to
be a property right that was synonymous with liberty itself because
property was so closely connected to the financial well being of
those who ruled the towns.22 This arrangement continued until the
19. See M. ROSTOVTZEFF, GREECE 72-73 (1963); JOHN H. MUNDY, EUROPE IN
THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES 1150-1309 422-31 (1973).
20. See Michael E. Libonati, Reconstructing Local Government, 19 URB. LAW. 647
n.13 (1987). The original idea of republican democracy as we understand it today is
generally attributed to the work of Machiavelli. See JOHN POCOCK, THE MACHIAVEL-
LIAN MOMENT (1975).
21. Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1083
(1980).
22. See C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUAL-
ISM (1962) for an analysis of how the writings of Hobbes, Harrington and especially
Locke contributed to an English liberalism based on property rights.
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late seventeenth century, when the king, at least temporarily, be-
gan to revoke many of the corporate charters.
The tradition of local autonomy also has firm roots in pre-colo-
nial America. Small groups of individuals began forming civil soci-
eties in New England in the early seventeenth century. What began
as the towns of Providence, Portsmouth, Newport and Warwick
only later became the united colony of Rhode Island.z3 In 1648,
the General Assembly of Rhode Island granted Providence a
"home rule" charter, creating a relationship between the town and
the colony resembling that which existed between the colony and
the Crown.
Before the Revolutionary War about twenty incorporated cities
existed in America.24 However, in New England, where local au-
tonomy was most prevalent, the towns had already ended their
subordinate associations with the colonial legislatures and became
more independent. These legislative bodies were composed of del-
egates whose very job it was to represent the interests of the
towns.25 The towns derived their governmental legitimacy, not
from the legal charters granted to them by the colony, but from the
free association of the people who created them-what Jefferson
and Tocqueville called popular sovereignty.26
2. Sovereignty and Community
The Jeffersonian vision of democracy is that of a decentralized
agrarian republic.27 Jefferson imagined a four tier system of gov-
ernment that was structured along the lines of federal, state, county
and ward authority. But it was the latter to which he paid most
attention. Each ward would encompass five or six square miles,
and it was here in these "little republics" that the true foundation
of democratic government resided. 8 Because sovereignty rests ul-
timately with the individual, wards must be small enough so that
each citizen can act directly and personally. He was particularly
enamored with the New England township, declaring it "the wisest
23. The town of Providence came into existence in 1636, Portsmouth (originally
Pocasset) in 1638, Newport in 1639, and Warwick in 1643. A parliamentary charter
was accepted in 1647. ANWAR HUSSAIN SYED, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERI-
CAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 22-24 (1966).
24. Frug, supra note 21, at 1096.
25. See ERNEST GRIFFITH, HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT: THE CO-
LONIAL PERIOD (1938) for a comprehensive account of how governmental institutions
evolved during this period.
26. CHARLES E. MERRIAM, HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY (1900).
27. See generally, SYED, supra note 23, at 38-52.
28. SYED, supra note 23, at 38.
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invention ever devised by the wit of man for the exercise of self-
government. ' 29
Jefferson had little regard for the idea of a historic corporate
community created by one's ancestry, insisting that "[t]he dead
have no rights!"' 30 He strongly believed that each generation
should have the right to form its own majority and devise its own
constitution; thus no governmental arrangement should be ex-
pected to endure beyond twenty years. He wrote,
Each generation is as independent as the one preceding, as that
was of all which had gone before. It has then, like them, a right
to choose for itself the form of government it believes most pro-
motive of its own happiness.3'
If it was Jefferson who first articulated a theory of American lo-
cal government, Tocqueville elaborated and popularized it.32 Toc-
queville also found the ideal model in the New England township
and in it the wellspring of democracy.33 Other levels of govern-
ment existed only because local assemblies of sovereign individuals
empowered them. For Tocqueville the legitimacy of local institu-
tions is based on the premise that they are natural associations of
free people, possessing a "communal freedom." 34 He observes,
In America not only do municipal bodies exist, but they are kept
alive and supported by town spirit.. .The New Englander is at-
tached to his township not so much because he was born in it,
but because it is a free and strong community, of which he is a
member, and which deserves the care spent in managing it ....
Their government is suited to their tastes, and chosen by
themselves.35
Under this characterization of local government, sovereignty and
community are complementary concepts. The town is sovereign
because it derives its legitimacy from a community of free individu-
als; but the community has integrity because it can function as a
29. SYED, supra note 23, at 39-40.
30. SYED, supra note 23, at 43.
31. SYED, supra note 23, at 43.
32. For a perceptive though critical treatment of Tocqueville's work, see GORDON
L. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE CITIES: INTERPRETING LOCAL AUTONOMY 159-171
(1985).
33. He writes, ..... municipal institutions constitute the strength of free nations.
Town meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within
the people's reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it." ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, VOL.I 63 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945).
34. CLARK, supra note 32, at 160.
35. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 33, at 69-70.
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sovereign entity with the power to initiate and execute action with-
out interference, according to its own values. Clark has made the
point that even contemporary writers as different as Castells, who
is a socialist, and Nozick, a conservative, agree that autonomy is
crucial in order for a community to have a sense of definition.36
The Supreme Court has recognized community standards as a legit-
imate criterion for justifying public policy on matters as diverse as
zoning and pornography. 7
B. Legal Notions
Notwithstanding the idealized image of local autonomy that has
become part of the American ethos, cities have no independent
legal standing within the federal constitutional system.38 The great
compromise arrived at by the Founders was an arrangement struck
between sovereign states and proponents of the centralized na-
tional government that was then forming. Local government was
not a significant element of the governance equation. Cities were
not granted protection in either the Constitution or the Bill of
Rights, but were subsumed under the general apparatus of state
government. This premise has been maintained by the Supreme
Court.39 Any serious claims for local self-determination are gener-
ally made against the states, their resolution being a matter of state
law.
36. CLARK, supra note 32, at 7. MANUEL CASTELLS, THE CITY AND THE GRASS
RooTs (1984); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
37. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Schad v. Borough
of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). For a critical review of the Court's application
of community standards, see Robert D. Chesler, Imagery of Community, Ideology of
Authority: The Moral Reasoning of Chief Justice Burger, 18 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV.
457 (1983).
38. See generally, M. DAVID GELFAND, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1984); The Constitutional Position of American
Local Government: Retrospect for the Burger Court and Prospect for the Rehnquist
Court, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 635 (1987); Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional
Vulnerability of American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American
Law, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 83 (1986) [hereinafter Constitutional Vulnerability]; James E.
Herget, The Missing Power of Local Governments: A Divergence Between Text and
Practice in our Early State Constitutions, 62 VA. L. REV. 999 (1976); Joseph P. Viter-
itti, The City and the Constitution: A Study of Institutional Evolution and Adaptation,
12 J. U"n. AFF. 221 (1990) [hereinafter The City and the Constitution].
39. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907). The Court ruled that the
State of Pennsylvania had the power to take city property without compensation. See
also, City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923); Williams v. Mayor of Balti-
more, 289 U.S. 36 (1933).
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1. State Prerogatives
Tocqueville's idea of local autonomy was most prominently
translated into legal doctrine by Judge Thomas M. Cooley of Mich-
igan. The distinguished jurist quotes Tocqueville liberally and
traced the right of local independence back to the English common
law tradition.40 However, noting that American towns preceded
American states, Cooley argued that these communities did not
surrender their natural sovereignty by the act of creating states. In
1871, he wrote in People v. Hurlbut:
the constitution [was] adopted in view of a system of local gov-
ernment well-understood and tolerably uniform in character, ex-
isting from the very earliest settlement of the country [and] the
liberties of the people [were] generally.... supposed to spring
from and be dependent upon that system.41
Cooley's thesis developed into a well formulated treatise42 that
earned the support of other highly regarded legal scholars. 43 Ulti-
mately, however, it would not prevail. American jurisprudence ac-
commodated the tradition of local self-governance with state
sovereignty defined in the federal Constitution, by drawing a dis-
tinction between private corporations founded to promote com-
mercial interests, and public corporations or cities which wielded
government power and were subject to state control. Protection
for private corporations was enunciated when the Supreme Court
refused to allow the state of New Hampshire to violate the charter
of Dartmouth College." Control of cities turned on the assump-
tion that cities were creatures of the state and not to the contrary
as Judge Cooley had asserted.45 State supremacy was exercised
40. THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA-
TIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERI-
CAN UNION 189-90 (1869) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS].
41. People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 98 (1871).
42. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 40; THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY,
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (1880).
43. See EUGENE MCQUILLIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TIONS § 64 (1911); Amasa M. Eaton, The Right to Local Self-Government, 13 HARV.
L. REv. 441 (1900); 14 HARV. L. REV. 20 (1901).
44. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
45. The best historical case study of how a city was transformed from a relatively
autonomous corporation to an object of state control is Hartog's examination of New
York. See HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPO-
RATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 (1983). See also
Hendrik Hartog, Because All the World Was Not New York City: Governance, Prop-
erty Rights and the State in the Changing Definition of a Corporation, 1730-1860, 28
BUFF. L. REV. 91 (1979); Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal Corpora-
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through the plenary power enjoyed by the legislature. As articu-
lated in Judge Dillon's famous decision:
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their
powers and rights wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into
them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it
creates, so it may destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and
control."
Dillon's Rule, developed into a widely read treatise on local gov-
ernment law,47 became a benchmark for legal scholarship. It was
generally accepted by the state courts nationally, and the notion of
state legislative supremacy over the cities was eventually adopted
by the United States Supreme Court.49
2. Home Rule
To rescue some semblance of power from increasingly aggressive
state legislatures, city officials attempted in the late nineteenth cen-
tury to enact amendments to their state constitutions that would
limit the scope of interference in local matters. Frug describes two
approaches.50 One technique was the prohibition against "special
legislation," designed to limit the power of state officials to enact
laws that are targeted at less than all cities or a class of cities in the
state. Constitutional provisions of this type have not served as an
effective instrument for curtailing legislative intrusion at the local
level. They merely define the terms of intrusion. The home rule
initiative sought to distinguish between inherently local and inher-
ently state concerns, thus reserving certain prerogatives within the
state constitution for local government. In 1875, Missouri was the
first state to adopt such a provision.5 ' Others followed, granting
tion: A Case Study in Legal Change, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 369 (1985), which discusses
developments in both New York and Massachusetts.
46. City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. R.R., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868).
47. JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1872). For a criti-
cal analysis of Dillon, see Constitutional Vulnerability, supra note 38.
48. See FRANK J. GOODNOW, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1897); HOWARD LEE MC-
BAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME RULE (1916); WILLIAM
MUNRO, THE GOVERNMENT OF AMERICAN CITIES (1923).
49. See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. at 187. The Court ruled that "[iln
the absence of state constitutional provisions safeguarding it to them, municipalities
have no inherent right of self-government which is beyond the legislative control of
the state." See also City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923).
50. Frug, supra note 21, at 1116-17.
51. Mo. CONST. art IX, § 16 (1875).
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cities varying degrees of power with different levels of specificity.5 2
The Ohio constitution appropriated "all powers of local govern-
ment" to local governments.5 3 California sought to insulate cities
from legislative interference in what it called "municipal affairs. '5 4
But what did this really mean? Who could draw such a fine distinc-
tion between state and local matters? The debate over state and
local prerogatives would impose a significant role on the state
courts to function as arbiters in the struggle.55 Following the lead
of Judge Dillon, the courts, more often than not, sided with the
state legislature. New York is an illustrative case in point.
C. New York State Law
1. Constitutional History
A decade before Judge Dillon wrote his important decision in
Iowa, New York State's highest court articulated a doctrine of leg-
islative omnipotence that set the tone of state and city relations in
perpetuity. At issue was a state law enacted in 1857 that abolished
the local police departments of New York City and Brooklyn and
replaced them with the state controlled Metropolitan Police Dis-
trict.56 City attorneys then argued that the law violated Section 2,
Article 10 of the State Constitution authorizing local governments
to elect and appoint their own officers. The court disagreed hold-
ing that the state legislature possesses "the whole law-making
power of the state. 57 Judge Shankland wrote:
[t]he legislative power is omnipotent within its proper sphere.
The legislature, in this respect, is the direct representative of the
people, and the delegate and depositary of their power. Hence,
the limitations of the constitution are not so much limitations of
52. By 1975 every state except Indiana, Alabama and Mississippi had adopted
home rule measures either through legislation or constitutional amendment. See J.D.
Hyman, Home Rule in New York 1941-1965: Retrospect and Prospect, 15 Bun'. L.
REV. 335 (1965); Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United
States, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269 (1968); Constitutional Municipal Home Rule
Since the AMA (NLC) Model, 17 WM & MARY L. REv. 1 (1975).
53. Michael E. Libonati, Intergovernmental Relations in State Constitutional Law:
A Historical Overview, 496 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 107, 110 (1988)
(quoting Ohio Const. art. XVIII, §§ 3, 7).
54. Id (quoting CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a)).
55. Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role
for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1964); Frank J. Macchiarola, Local Government
Home Rule and the Judiciary, 48 U. DET. J. URB. L. 335 (1971).
56. See JAMES F. RICHARDSON, THE NEW YORK POLICE: COLONIAL TIMES TO
1901 82-164 (1970). The Board of Estimate and Apportionment would be created by
the state seven years later to assess the finances of the regional police agency.
57. People ex rel. Wood v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 532, 543 (1857).
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the legislature as of the power of the people themselves, self
imposed by the constitutional compact.58
The concept of home rule was incorporated into the New York
State Constitution in 1894.59 Notwithstanding later revisions to the
provision designed to enhance the power of local governments, the
courts have not found home rule to be a compelling reason to real-
locate authority away from the state legislature.60 Between 1894
and 1923 the Court of Appeals upheld a number of significant laws
that encroached on local power without prior approval by the
mayor. 61 For example, in 1913 the court allowed separation of the
Bronx from New York County on the strength of a Bronx referen-
dum.62 The law from which the split arose required a binding ref-
erendum from the Bronx territory exclusive of New York City
voters.
In 1923 the state constitution was again amended. Although the
new language revoked the temporary veto power of mayors, it prG-
vided that any special law affecting "the property, affairs or gov-
ernment of any city" 63 would require a message from the Governor
declaring an emergency and the concurrence of a two-thirds major-
ity in each house of the legislature.64 This amendment was cited in
a unanimous Court of Appeals decision striking down a state law
affecting New York City. Chief Justice Cardozo, writing for the
court, issued well known dictum often cited by advocates of home
rule.65 Yet, this case would prove to be an only temporary aberra-
58. Id. at 549.
59. This required that any special law relating to the "property, affairs, or govern-
ment" of a city requires a home rule message from the mayor. If the mayor refused,
the legislature wouldhave to pass it a second time. N.Y. CONST. art. XII, § 2 (1894).
60. See W. Bernard Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule in New York, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 311 (1954) and Constitutional City Home Rule in New York: II, 55
COLUM. L. REV. 598 (1955); James D. Cole, Constitutional Home Rule in New York:
"The Ghost of Home Rule," 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 713 (1985); Hyman, supra note 52.
61. People ex rel. Einsfeld v. Murray, 149 N.Y. 367, 44 N.E. 146 (1896); Admiral
Realty Co. v. City of New York, 206 N.Y. 110, 99 N.E. 241 (1912); Tenement House
Dep't. v. Moeschen, 179 N.Y. 325, 72 N.E. 231 (1904), aff'd, 203 U.S. 583 (1906);
Matter of McAneny v. Board of Estimate and Apportionment, 232 N.Y. 377, 134 N.E.
187 (1922).
62. People ex rel. Unger v. Kennedy, 207 N.Y. 533, 101 N.E. 442 (1913).
63. N.Y. CONST. art. XII, sec. 2 (1923). That same year the City Home Rule Law
was passed to support the implementation of the recent constitutional amendment.
CiTY HOME RULE LAw, ch. 363, 1924 N.Y. Laws 706.
64. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 20 (McKinney 1994).
65. Judge Cardozo wrote, "The Home Rule amendment established a new test.
We are no longer confined to the inquiry whether an act is general or local 'in its
terms'.. . . Home Rule for cities, adopted by the people with much ado and after
many years of agitation, will be another Statute of Uses, a form of words and little
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tion in a general pattern of constitutional interpretation that fa-
vored the plenary power of the state legislature.66
2. Adler and Lawrence
In 1929, the Court of Appeals directly considered the issue of
'how to resolve the dispute between state and local prerogatives
under home rule in Adler v. Deegan.67 The result of this case,
which involved the Multiple Dwelling Law68 affecting New York
City, was quite unambiguous. The Court of Appeals held that
whenever a substantial state concern is at issue, the legislature has
the authority to act regardless of the existing weight of local inter-
est.69 Because the underlying law might also impact the health and
welfare of the rest of the state, the court held that the legislature
could act without the impediments of home rule. Writing sepa-
rately, Judge Cardozo concurred, stating that "the State, acting by
local laws and without emergency measure, must keep its hands off
unless a State concern is involved or affected, and this in some sub-
stantial measure. '70
Earlier that year, the Court of Appeals ruled in City of New
York v. Village of Lawrence, a case that involved a boundary dis-
pute between New York City and the Village of Lawrence. The
Lawrence decision proved particularly relevant to the Staten Island
issue. When the city challenged a state law that transferred terri-
tory from eastern Queens to Nassau County, the court found that
"legislation relating to the boundaries of political subdivisions of
the State is a matter of State concern, and its benefits extend be-
yond the limits of the property, affairs and government of the city
else, if the courts in applying the new tests shall ignore the new spirit that dictated
their adoption. The municipality is to be protected in its autonomy against the in-
roads of evasion." In re Elm Street, 246 N.Y. 72, 76, 158 N.E. 24, 25-26 (1927).
66. Almost simultaneously, an appellate division court took a contrary position in
a boundary dispute, holding "[t]he authority of the Legislature over the boundaries of
subdivisions of the State is absolute. It may consolidate, add to or take from the
territory of a municipality or district, without the consent of the municipality or dis-
trict affected." Adriaansen v. Board of Education, 222 A.D. 320, 323-324, 226 N.Y.S.
145, 147 (1927), aff'd, 248 N.Y. 542, 162 N.E. 517 (1928).
67. 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929).
68. MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW Ch. 713, 1929 N.Y. Laws 1663.
69. "[I]f the subject be in a substantial degree a matter of State concern, the Legis-
lature may act, though intermingled with it are concerns of the locality." Adler, 251
N.Y. at 491, 167 N.E. at 714. See also, New York Steam Corp. v. City of New York,
268 N.Y. 137, 197 N.E. 172 (1935).
70. Adler, 251 N.Y. at 485, 167 N.E. at 711 (Cardozo, C.J., concurring).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
which is affected."'" In words reminiscent of Judge Dillon, the
court ruled that "the legislature may create or destroy, enlarge or
restrict, combine or divide, municipal corporations. 72
In 1938 the state constitution was amended to eliminate the re-
quirement that the governor declare an emergency to allow for a
special law, replacing it with the need for a home rule message
ftom the city. 73 Nevertheless, subsequent judicial rulings continued
to rely on the Adler74 and Lawrence75 opinions as measures of state
prerogatives.76 A final amendment to the state constitution, this
time including a Bill of Rights for Local Governments '77, bolstered
by a supporting statute,78 was approved in 1963, again with little
effect.
The first significant case arising under the present constitutional
standard concerned legislation that created the Adirondack Park
Agency.79 Although the Court of Appeals recognized that the stat-
ute in question interfered with local matters, it drew on legal prece-
dent to determine that
[i]t mattered not that in each of these cases there was encroach-
ment upon local concerns; the vital distinction was that the sub-
ject matter in need of legislative. .. . [action] was of sufficient
importance to the State, transcendent of local or parochial inter-
ests or concerns.80
In subsequent cases the state high court upheld laws that re-
quired the City of New York to appropriate a certain portion of its
71. City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, 250 1.Y. 429, 440, 165 N.E. 836, 839
(1929).
72. Id. at 437, 165 N.E. at 838.
73. The amendment expressly granted cities the power to "adopt and amend local
laws not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the state." N.Y. CoNST. art.
IX, § 2 (1938). Under these provisions a home rule request must be made by either
two-thirds of the local legislature or the local chief executive and a majority of the
legislature.
74. Adler, 251 N.Y. at 491, 167 N.E. at 707.
75. Lawrence, 250 N.Y. at 439-40, 165 N.E. at 838-39.
76. See Connolly v. Stand, 192 Misc. 872, 83 N.Y.S.2d 445, aff'd without opinion,
274 A.D. 877, 82 N.Y.S.2d 922, aff'd without opinion, 298 N.Y. 658, 82 N.E.2d 399
(1948); Ainslee v. Lounsberry, 275 A.D. 729, 86 N.Y.S.2d 857, appeal denied, 275
A.D. 865, 89 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1949).
77. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
78. N.Y. MuN. HOME RULa LAW § 51 (McKinney 1963); N.Y. STAT. LOCAL
GoV'Ts LAW § 20 (McKinney 1963).
79. ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY ACT, ch. 348, 1973 N.Y. Laws 540.
80. Wambat Realty Corp. v. State of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 494, 362 N.E.2d
581, 584, 393 N.Y.S.2d 949, 952 (1977).
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budget to education,8' to exempt firefighters in New York City
from local residency requirements, 2 to limit the use of landfills on
Long Island,83 and to determine the compensation of local district
attorneys.84 Common to all these decisions was the underlying
claim that a significant state interest existed.
Most recently, a June 1995 decision by the Court of Appeals
drew upon the principle of state supremacy to determine that the
City of New York lacks the capacity to bring a suit against the state
challenging existing school finance formulae.85 Writing for a 4-2
majority, Judge Levine found:
Constitutionally as well as a matter of historical fact, municipal
corporate bodies-counties, towns, school districts-are merely
subdivisions of the State, created by the State for the convenient
carrying out of the State's governmental powers and responsibil-
ities as its agents.... it followed that municipal corporate bodies
cannot have the right to contest the actions of their principal or
creator .... 86
3. Staten Island Cases
When New York City challenged the Staten Island legislation it
cited a litany of facts pointing to the significant local interest that is
at stake in the proceeding: secession would mean the loss of nearly
400,000 people (5% of the population) and 19.5% of the city's total
land mass;87 the City has invested in a large infrastructure on the
island;88 secession would result in the loss of revenues from prop-
erty, sales and income taxes collected on the island;89 secession
81. Board of Education v. City of New York, 41 N.Y.2d 535, 362 N.E.2d 948, 394
N.Y.S.2d 148 (1977).
82. Uniformed Firefighters Association v. City of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 85, 405
N.E.2d 679, 428 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1980).
83. Town of Islip v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 50, 473 N.E.2d 756, 484 N.Y.S.2d 528
(1984).
84. Kelly v. McGee, 57 N.Y.2d 522, 443 N.E.2d 908, 457 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1982).
85. City of New York v. State of New York, 86 N.Y.2d 286, 289, 631 N.Y.S.2d 553
(1995).
86. Id at 289-90, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 554-55.
87. Brief of the Appellant at 0-11, for City of New York v. State of New York, 76
N.Y.2d 479, 561 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1990) (on file with the FORDHAM URBAN LAW
JOURNAL).
88. This allegedly includes "more than 50 schools, more than 25 parks, 18 fire-
houses, approximately a dozen libraries.... three police precincts, a hospital a ferry
terminal, over 1,000 miles of paved streets, almost 900 miles of water pipes, over 650
miles of sewers, 33,475 street lights, and a variety of other buildings and properties."
Id. at 11.
89. Id. at 12.
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would require New York City to restructure its government and to
redraw the lines of City Cov'ncil districts. 90
Although these claims served to demonstrate that secession af-
fected the "property, affairs and government" of the city, prior in-
terpretations of home rule in New York State demonstrate that
local interest is not pivotal in such matters. The key issue is the
existence of a significant state interest. It is, therefore, not surpris-
ing that the Appellate Division found that
Legislation dealing with matters of state concern, albeit of lo-
calized application and having a direct effect on the most basic
of local interests, does not violate the Constitution's home rule
provisions.91
The court ruled that the legislature has "plenary" power to act "un-
fettered by home rule constraints" because the secession of Staten
Island is "a matter of State concern by definition." 92
Although the Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate ruling, its
decision rested on different grounds. It treated the legislation as a
purely speculative action that "allows Staten Island to explore its
[already] publicized interest in secession stripped of any force with-
out any further act of the Legislature. '93 In this sense the court
was not ready to concede that there was any interference with the
"property, affairs or government" of the city. The state high court
was resolute in explaining that it was not at this time disposing of
the home rule issue with regard to secession:
"We expressly decline to decide as unnecessary and premature
whether genuine secession legislation, if ever it was to come
before the legislature, would require a home rule message.994
Notwithstanding a century of constitutional and judicial history
pointing in the direction of legislative supremacy, some advocates
believe that the Court of Appeals latest declaration may allow a
home rule challenge if separation is approved by the legislature.95
This reading of the case stands in bold contrast to the strong posi-
tion taken by the Appellate Division which affirmatively ruled on
90. Id. at 15.
91. City of New York v. State of New York, 158 A.D.2d 169, 173, 557 N.Y.S.2d
914, 916 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1990).
92. Id.
93. City of New York v. State of New York, 76 N.Y.2d at 487, 562 N.E.2d at 121,
561 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
94. Id., 76 N.Y.2d at 484, 562 N.E.2d at 120, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 156.
95. See e.g., id. at 487, 562 N.E.2d at 121, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 157 (Hancock, J.,
dissenting).
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the secession question.96 Nevertheless, the Speaker of the Assem-
bly refused to take up the final measure of secession without a
home rule message from the city.
It was a rather curious development for the Speaker to introduce
the question of home rule at so late a date. After all, it was the
legislature itself that had defined the process of secession which
was in the midst of unfolding. The original 1989 bill passed both
houses of the legislature, and would have enacted separation upon
the passage of the referendum, without either a home rule message
or further action from the legislature. Significantly, the Home
Rule Counsel of the Assembly, who advised the Speaker to with-
hold action, testified that some cases in which a significant local
concern exists do not require a home rule message.97
The trial judge noted that the appellate court "expressly found
that a secession bill would not require a home rule message and
that this decision was not overturned by the Court of Appeals."98
He also recognized that "the Speaker may have misapplied the
Constitution." 99 But, restrained by his interpretation of the separa-
tion of powers principle, the judge refused to intervene.
D. Home Rule and Secession
1. The Legal Quagmire
The case law has remained constant: when determining local
boundaries or the creation or dissolution of a local government, the
state legislature rules supreme without any diminution of its pre-
rogatives suffered on the basis of home rule. Imposition of a home
rule requirement as a prerequisite to legislative action is a reversal
of long standing legal precedents. Some legal scholars argue that if
96. Citing arguments made by the State Attorney General, the court pointed out,
"[T]here is no reason to suppose that the legislators who enacted chapter 733 intend
to await a home rule message from the City of New York before passing upon the
enabling legislation should the process go that far.... The State's position is that
chapter 773 would be constitutional without a home rule message even if affirmative
votes by Staten Islanders in the referenda .... were determinative and not merely
advisory." City of New York v. State of New York, 158 A.D.2d 169, 171-72, 557
N.Y.S.2d 914, 915 (A.D. 1 Dept. 1990).
97. "[Sjome bills do not require a Home Rule Request even though they affect the
property, affairs or government of local government because the subject matter impli-
cates a state concern under the doctrine enunciated by the New York Court of Ap-
peals in Adler v. Deegan." Affidavit of Karen R. Kaufman, for Straniere v. Silver,
Index No. 3213-94, at 8, August 11, 1994 (on file with FORDHAM URBAN LAW
JOURNAL).
98. Kaufman Affidavit, supra note 97.
99. Kaufman Affidavit, supra note 97, at 10.
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ever there were occasion for such a legal "sea change," secession
warrants it because nothing goes more to the heart of the "prop-
erty, affairs or government" of a city than an attempt to remove
part of its territory.00
For example, Richard Briffault, after a comprehensive review of
the constitutional case law, argues that the process adopted by the
governor and legislature of New York State'should be invalidated
on home rule grounds and replaced by one he proposes. He would
give New York City an opportunity to reject Staten Island seces-
sion after the people on the island have voted.' 10 A final review by
the state could overturn a denial by the city "on the basis of the
'overall public interest' of the region." 0 2 This procedure appears
to impose a rather strict limit on state action. Does the legislature
have to find that secession is good for the region in order to allow
it? Or is it sufficient to show that secession isn't bad? How would
one measure the public interest in this case? What if the legislature
found that secession would have a neutral impact on the state, the
city and Staten Island, but New York City still opposed it? Would
the state be prohibited from authorizing secession?
Briffault suggests that the decision making process should favor
the status quo and impede secession, especially if the existing city
government is against it. His decision making model is based upon
the annexation provisions of the New York State Constitution.0 3
The analogy and the process are inappropriate. Annexation is the
appropriation of territory from one jurisdiction to another.1' 4 Se-
cession is a plea for self-government involving a different level of
100. See Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule and Municipal Government,
92 COLUM. L. RExV. 775, 818-822 (1992); Jeffrey Underweiser, Note, The Legality of
Staten Island's Attempt to Secede from New York City, 19 FORD14AM URB. L.J. 147,
167-69 (1991).
101. Briffault, supra note 100, at 818-19.
102. Briffault, supra note 100, at 819.
103. Id at 818; cf N.Y. CONST. art. IX, sec. 1(d). Briffault points out that this
process is similar to the "deannexation" procedure that exists in New Jersey. Id. See
also, Ryan v. Mayor of Demarest, 319 A.2d 442, 446-47 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1974); West
Point Island Civic Ass'n v. Township Committee, 255 A.2d. 237 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1969).
Notably, there is a Wide variance in annexation laws among the states. M.G. Wood-
rooff, III, Systems and Standards of Municipal Annexation Review: A Comparative
Analysis, 58 GEO. LJ. 743 (1970). See also Laurie Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal
Annexation Powers, 24 URB. LAW. 247 (1992), who suggests that "[plerhaps the
strongest motivating force in determining the shape of state annexation statutes is the
notion that individuals should have the right to choose the government under which
they live." Id. at 266.
104. See generally, Thomas Dye, Urban Political Integration: Conditions Associated
With Annexation in American Cities, 8 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 430 (1964).
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interest for the territory in question. Secession is more analogous
to incorporation, where a self-contained community with common
interests seeks to establish itself as a separate entity. 10 5 As Brif-
fault explains elsewhere, most state incorporation laws require only
the consent of voters in the new city before being approved by the
legislature. 10 6 For either the legislature or the courts to grant the
city veto power over secession on the grounds of home rule is to
render secession virtually impossible. No jurisdiction is likely to
cede territory willingly. However, there may very well be condi-
tions under which pleas for self government by a smaller territory
are justified. 0 7 The contrary may also be true. Under certain cir-
cumstances secession may be harmful to the original city jurisdic-
tion, or the state, or even the people in the territory seeking
separation. As a matter of public policy, an independent arbiter is
needed in such disputes, who is capable of weighing all interests.
As a matter of law and tradition, the most reasonable candidate for
that deliberative role is the state legislature.
The state legislature provides a forum in which the representa-
tives of all parties can voice their positions on the question at hand.
Furthermore, the state legislature is singularly qualified to assess
the alternatives from the perspective of what is good for the state.
Moreover, in secession cases state concerns are paramount. Rather
than provide the exceptional case that legitimizes the suspension of
Dillon's Rule, secession is the fundamental issue of local govern-
ance which underscores Dillon's wisdom.
2. Dependent Cities
The subordination of local government to state government is
not just a matter of law - it is a practical consequence of fiscal real-
ity. Contemporary American cities are not analogous to the in-
dependent commercial entities that were found in the townships of
medieval England or pre-Colonial America. Rather, they are part
105. See Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. City-of Silver Grove, 249 S.W.2d 520 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1952). See also GARY J. MILLER, CITIES BY CONTRACT- THE POLITICS OF MU-
NICIPAL INCORPORATION (1981).
106. "In most states, general enabling legislation places municipal incorporation in
the hands of local residents or landowners.... Neighboring localities, regional entities
and residents outside of the boundaries of the territory proposed to be incorporated
generally have no role.... The principal criterion for deciding whether a municipality
;ill be incorporated is whether the local people want it." Richard Briffault, Our Lo-
calism Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 74
(1990). [hereinafter Our Localism, 1]. See also Daniel Mandelker, Standards for Mu-
nicipal Incorporations on the Urban Fringe, 36 TEX. L. REV. 271 (1958).
107. See infra Part III for detailed discussion.
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of an elaborate intergovernmental network that shapes local policy
and engenders a relationship of fiscal dependence.1 8 This depen-
dent relationship is especially pronounced in the larger cities of the
Northeast where redistributive fiscal policies designed to assist the
poor have resulted in severe financial burdens that can not be sup-
ported by local revenues. 109
One of the characteristic themes in the literature on urban gov-
ernment appearing in the last two decades is an emphasis on its
limitations. Local government, we are told, is simply too con-
strained by socio-economic conditions, interest groups, its fiscal ca-
pability, the courts, intergovernmental mandates, and a myriad of
other political and institutional factors that prevent it from imple-
menting policies that measure up to its problems.110 In order to
accommodate an ambitious social agenda, cities have had to rely
on a broader revenue base than that which is found within their
own boarders. This intricate web of financial relationships makes a
compelling argument against the notion of local autonomy. No-
body better explains the point than Richard Briffault:
The logic of local legal autonomy assumes local solutions to lo-
cal problems, with local programs funded by taxes on local prop-
erty. Many big cities, however, have relatively large social
welfare and infrastructure demands. Local political existence,
zoning autonomy and taxable property provide neither the regu-
latory authority nor the revenues necessary to meet these
problems. To cope successfully with local needs, these cities
must look beyond the city limits to outside public and private
actions: intergovernmental aid, additional revenue-raising au-
thority from the state and private investment."'
Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of local dependence oc-
curs during a fiscal crisis. When New York City stood at the brink
108. See WILLIAM J. PAMMER, MANAGING FISCAL STRESS IN MAJOR AMERICAN
CITIES (1990); HELEN F. LADD & JON YINGER, AMERICA'S AILING CITIES: FISCAL
HEALTH AND THE DESIGN OF URBAN POLICY (1989); KATHARINE L. BRADBURY ET
AL., URBAN DECLINE AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN CITIES (1982); RoY W. BAHL,
FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE 1980's (1984).
109. See Joseph P. Viteritti & Thomas W. Matteo, The Political Economy of City
Life Cycles: A Comparative Analysis of Services, Expenditures and Revenues, 6 PUB.
BUD. & FIN. MGMT. 519 (1994); Richard P. Nathan & Charles F. Adams, Four Per-
spectives on Urban Hardship, 104 POL. SCI. Q. 483 (1989); Nathan & Adams, Under-
standing Central City Hardship, 91 POL. Sci. Q. 47 (1976).
110. See PAUL KANTOR, THE DEPENDENT CITY (1988); PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY
LIMITS (1981); DOUGLAS YATES, THE UNGOVERNABLE CITY (1977), all of which de-
velop the theme of local dependency.
111. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part lI-Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 349-50 (1990) [hereinafter Our Localism, I1].
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of bankruptcy in 1976, a major restructuring of the governmental
apparatus took place that centralized decision making under state
authority. 12 It was assumed at the time that the bulk of the burden
for the city's recovery would fall upon state officials. The state
government would bear a similar weight of responsibility in the
case of municipal secession. If the separation resulted in financial
calamity for either the original jurisdiction or the new territory, the
state would be expected to execute a rescue. It is for this reason
that the state has a paramount interest in secession.
3. The Search for Community
I do not suggest that the fiscal dependence of cities is sufficient
reason to snuff out the tradition of localism that gave rise to home
rule. The issue is one of balance. The spirit of community discov-
ered by Jefferson and Tocqueville is a well established American
value, a part of our civic culture. Secession movements, however,
may be as much an expression of that value as is home rule. Large
impersonal bureaucratic municipalities have been as much, and
perhaps a greater frustration to the community spirit as has state
government. The behavioral evidence supporting this point is quite
persuasive.
The "community revolution"113 that encompassed urban areas
during the nineteen sixties and seventies was a reaction to big city
government. Community activists sought to bring decision making
down to the neighborhood so that government could become more
responsive and operate on a human level. New York City has a
long history of attempts at decentralization. 4 The instinct to en-
gender community within a local governmental structure that has
in excess of 200,000 public employees and a budget of more that
112. This institutional restructuring is described in ROBERT W. BAILEY, THE CRISIS
REGIME (1984). See also, ESTER R. FUCHS, MAYORS AND MONEY: FISCAL POLICY IN
NEW YORK AND CHICAGO (1992); MARTIN SHEFTER, POLITICAL CRISIS, FISCAL CRI-
SIS (1985).
113. The term is taken from Daniel Bell & Virginia Held, The Community Revolu-
tion, 16 PUB. INTEREST 142 (1969). See ALAN A. ALTSHULER, COMMUNITY CONTROL
(1970); MILTON KOTLER, NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNMENT (1969). For a critical as-
sessment of this movement see JOSEPH P. VITERrIri, BUREAUCRACY AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE (1979).
114. See Joseph P. Viteritti & Robert F. Pecorella, COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT AND
THE DECENTRALIZATION OF SERVICES, REPORT TO THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER
REVISION COMMISSION (1987); Robert F. Pecorella, COMMUNITY POWER IN A POST-
REFORM CITY (1994) [hereinafter COMMUNITY POWER]; JOHN MUDD, NEIGHBOR-
HOOD SERVICES (1984).
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$30 billion is readily understandable. However, the institutional
obstacles to success are overwhelming.
It is difficult to foster a localism that is personal and that pro-
motes community ideals, in a governmental apparatus which is
larger than all but two states. 1 5 Recent attempts at borough gov-
ernance, at community policing and at school based decision-mak-
ing are further manifestations of a frustrated community
idealism. 1 6 So is secession,"17 which ultimately is an appeal by a
community with a particular set of political values to create a gov-
ernment that is more responsive to its needs. It is an attempt at
local self determination. Invoking home rule as a weapon to defeat
secession is the ultimate irony in American local government law
and politics.
II. Secession As A Political and Legal Concept
The state legislature is the appropriate governmental institution
to assess the merits of an appeal for secession by a territory from
an existing municipality." 8 The next order of business is to deter-
mine what criteria should be adopted to conduct a fair review.
While existing principles of state law regarding incorporation and
to a lesser extent annexation are somewhat relevant on the matter,
7 they are of limited value. A more enlightening literature on seces-
sion is found in the field of international affairs. Here again, how-
ever, the application of political and legal principles is not direct. It
is necessary to transpose these principles so that they are useful in
the context of American state and local government.
115. Only the states of New York and California employ a governmental apparatus
larger than that of New York City. See ALMANAC OF THE 50 STATES, 38, 262 (E.
Homer ed., 1995).
116. See Joseph P. Viteritti, Decentralization in New York City: A Three Dimen-
sional Perspective (paper presented before the Citizens Union of New York City, July
21, 1994). During 1993, the borough president of Brooklyn proposed a plan that
would decentralize several municipal functions to the borough level, while the bor-
ough presidents of Queens and Manhattan put forward a borough plan for school
governance.
117. The former Democratic party leader of New York County, Edward Costikyan,
attributes the de-personalization of city government in part to the decline of the party
system which provided many services to people when the party organization served as
a conduit to the agencies. He writes, "[o]nce [party] leaders lost.... access to govern-
ment, people lost access to government. Ever since then, there has been a continuing
unhappiness in the remoteness and inaccessibility of government. This unhappiness,
from time to time, has led to efforts to decentralize, and today has led to an effort by
Staten Island to secede and a likely similar effort in Queens." Edward N. Costikyan,
Politics in New York City: A Memoir of the Post-War Years, 74 N.Y. HIST. 432 (1993).
118. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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A. The Idea....
1. And Self-Determination
As encountered in the discussion of home rule, the concept of
secession arises from the principle of self-determination, which has
roots in the political concept of popular sovereignty."19 To assert
that self-determination has a place in American political thought is
an understatement. It is the very principle upon which the republic
was founded. As Thomas Jefferson himself wrote in the Declara-
tion of Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men. . . .are en-
dowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights .... That
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it,
and to institute new Government....
Based on the French Revolution's Declaration of the Rights of
Man, Jefferson saw self-determination as a natural human right
that existed prior to the formation of any system of government.'12
Thus, Jefferson was sympathetic to secession. Even Abraham Lin-
coln, who staunchly defended the preservation of the Union during
his Civil War Presidency, supported the concept of secession earlier
in his life. Commenting on the war with Mexico in 1848, he said
that
Any people anywhere, being inclined and having the power,
have the right to rise up, and shake off the existing government,
and form a new one that suits them better. This is a most valua-
ble, - a most sacred right.... Nor is this right confined to cases
to which the whole people of an existing government, may
choose to exercise it. Any portion of such people can, may revo-
lutionize, and make their own, of so much of the territory as
they inhabit. 22
119. See discussion, supra Part I.A.
120. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
121. Sureda writes, "The history of self-determination is bound up with the history
of the doctrine of popular sovereignty proclaimed by the French Revolution: govern-
ment should be based on the will of the people.... and people not content with the
government of the country to which they belong should be able to secede and organ-
ize themselves as they wish." A. Rioo SUREDA, THE EvOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF
SELF-DETERMINATION 17 (1973).
122. Speech in the U.S. House of Representatives, The War With Mexico, January
12, 1848, 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 431, 438 (R. Basler, ed.
1953), as cited in LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMI-
NATION 111 (1978). After his election as President, of course, Lincoln equated seces-
sion with the "essence of anarchy." First Inaugural Address, 4 COLLECTED WORKS
OF LINCOLN, supra, at 262, 268, as cited in BUCHHEIT, supra, at 110.
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Notwithstanding such notable endorsements from the summit of
American political philosophy, the idea of secession is complex and
potentially problematic. When applied to an international perspec-
tive, for example, it takes on other connotations. Some of these
applications are not directly relevant to the context of American
state and local governments; nevertheless, they can be informative
in helping us to sort out the circumstances under which secession
may be justified.
Secession is a form of political action that is usually embarked
upon as a remedy for historic injustices. Whether or not one
abides by the legitimacy of self-determination claims, alternative
forms of political action are available to aggrieved groups.
Brilmayer distinguishes between the separatist and the refugee. 23
The latter seeks to flee the territory of an oppressive government,
the former wants to occupy and control a part of it. In this sense,
secession is a much more aggressive form of action than pursuing
the "exit" option. 24
Secession must by definition involve a territorial dispute assert-
ing the moral superiority of self-determination over the preserva-
tion of political boundaries. Brilmayer disagrees with the
appropriateness of this assertion, claiming that while liberal de-
mocracy is based on the theory of consent, it does not incidentally
imply the right to secede.125 Therefore the notion that there is such
a thing as a legal right to secede in the liberal state is at best debat-
able. 26 Even the right to rebel, which has strong roots in liberal
theory, does not necessarily involve an action against a territory;
instead, it is directed primarily at the regime that controls the
government. 27
Self-determination, as this Article contemplates it, is not imme-
diately transferable to an international context. This is because, as
a product of liberal democratic thought, self determination is com-
monly associated with the rights of individuals rather than groups,
peoples or nations. 128 Conversely, where secession is. on a global
123. Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation,
16 YALE J. INT'L L. 177, 187-89 (1991).
124. See generally, ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
125. Brilmayer, supra note 123, at 184-87.
126. See MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE
(1982).
127. The idea of a right to rebel is especially identified with Locke. See JOHN
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 134-48 (Richard H. Cox ed., 1982)
128. See ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE
FROM FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC 34-81 (1991).
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scale, it is impossible to separate the concept of self-determination
from that of nationalism, and with it the ethnic and cultural bonds
that form a people into a unified state.129
In reviewing the history of the United Nations, Buchheit found
that the principle of self-determination was primarily accepted as a
defense for decolonization rather than secession. 130 The distinction
is important. Although there is support in the international com-
munity for people to assume control of their own territory from a
colonial power (an act of nationalism in itself), there is little sym-
pathy for attempts that violate the territorial integrity of estab-
lished governments. 131 To tolerate such action is to jeopardize the
viability of the nation state, compromising constitutional govern-
ment as we know it. From a legal viewpoint separatist appeals are
generally viewed as being highly suspect and undesirable in the in-
ternational community.
2. And Constitutionalism
The possibility of secession is a rather unsettling prospect from
the perspective of constitutional government. As Sunstein argues,
it creates incentives for strategic behavior in democratic systems
and promotes instability.132 The threat of separation provides mi-
norities with a potent weapon that undermines the principle of ma-
jority rule. 33 If a minority is dissatisfied with the status quo, it can
break off and shatter the entire political arrangement. Sunstein
would have us believe that within a constitutional framework,
there can be no legal right to secede. For him secession violates
the "pre-commitment strategy" of the governmental system, which
forecloses debate on certain questions for the sake of the union
itself.'M The thought is, as one scholar puts it, inherently
anarchistic. 135
Nevertheless, moral precedent exists for the fragile social ar-
rangement of the right to secede. We find it in what Aristotle de-
129. See generally, ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983).
130. BUCHHEIT, supra note 122, at 87.
131. Brilmayer points out that even though anti-colonial movements were pro-
pelled by the ideal of self-determination, some of the new governments did not afford
their own minority groups the same rights. Brilmayer, supra note 123, at 182.
132. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 634
(1991).
133. See also BUCHANAN, supra note 128, at 98-99.
134. See Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CON-
STiTunONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
135. See BUCHANAN, supra note 128, at 102-04.
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scribed as the basic political unit, 3 ' the family. Given the high
divorce rate in the United States,137 one must concede that Ameri-
cans have accepted or at least tolerated instability in the most fun-
damental of social institutions under the protection of legal
sanctions. Given the relatively low incidence of secession among
democratic states, the evidence suggests that political systems are
far less vulnerable. The most glaring example of a constitutional
right to secede among modem states was found in the former So-
viet republic. Yet despite the underlying constitutional right, the
eventual demise of the Soviet Union arose primarily from the over-
all lack of legitimacy that plagued the government itself.138
The threat that secession poses to constitutional government is
overstated, the fear of its consequences widely misplaced. Assume,
for instance, that a particular minority seeks to separate itself from
a government. Does the majority have an inherent right to refuse?
Certainly to grant such a prerogative to the majority creates an-
other kind of problem, one that is more symptomatic of democratic
government, its capacity to neglect the interests of a minority. The
fundamental dilemma of democratic government is not the threat it
poses to the majority, but a phenomenon that Tocqueville 139 and
Madison 140 referred to as the "tyranny of the majority."
The Madisonian construct that undergirds American constitu-
tionalism is based upon a professed faith in pluralism.' 41 Madison
believed that in a large and diverse republic, political interests
would be transitory in nature. 42 I may stand with a losing minority
on one issue, but I stand securely with the majority on the next
question. One accepts the decision rules of majoritarian govern-
ment because one does not expect to reside in the loosing camp in
perpetuity. This affords the system legitimacy. There is a consider-
136. THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 1-38 (Ernest Barker ed., 1962).
137. About half the marriages in the United States end in divorce. Susan Chira,
Struggling to Find Stability When Divorce Is a Pattern, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1995 § 1,
at 1.
138. See infra part II.A.3 for further discussion.
139. TOCoUEVILLE, supra note 33, at 264-80.
140. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON AND JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS 77-84 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
141. Madison wrote, "[e]xtend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of par-
ties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive
exists it will be more difficult for those who feel it to discover their own stren:gth and
act in unison with each other' Id. at 83.
142. See Joseph P. Viteritti, Unapportioned Justice: Local Elections, Social Sciences,
and the Evolution of the Voting Rights Act, 4 COR. J. L. PUB. POL'Y 199, 265-70 (1994)
[hereinafter Unapportioned Justice].
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able amount of empirical evidence on interest group politics in
America supporting these basic assumptions. 143 Unfortunately,
however, these assumptions do not always hold true.
Perhaps the most dramatic historic example of a flaw in the
Madisonian construct is found in our racial politics. 144 But there
may be others that are less profound. Permanent minority status in
a political process may be determined by ethnicity, religion, gen-
der, sexual orientation, geography or a host of other fact-specific
circumstances. To offer secession as a strategic option available in
ordinary political conflict is highly provocative and potentially dis-
ruptive to the political order. However, in the context of American
federalism, the prospect is far less threatening than it is on a na-
tional or international scale.
The constitutional crisis described by Sunstein hangs over the na-
tion-state because there is usually no deliberative mechanism to re-
solve a separatist dispute within a sovereign state, other than the
sheer force of interest exercised by the parties to the controversy.
Therefore the nature of the encounter is inherently anarchistic.
The stakes that are at risk in American local government are differ-
ent and potentially less damaging to the political order. Since the
ultimate determination of a secession appeal lies with the state leg-
islature, 45 the resolution of the dispute is not directly in the hands
of the adversarial parties. Notwithstanding a tradition of home
rule, state constitutional law protects the sovereignty of the state
and thereby avoids the constitutional crisis that is apparent in a
national or international sphere. Existing decision rules empower
the legislature to arbitrate between two conflicting claims for local
self-determination, and to balance these claims against the para-
mount interests of the state. In the end, the idea of secession is
compatible with American state constitutional law.
3. And Legitimacy
Even Sunstein, who strongly opposes the suggestion of a consti-
tutional right to secede, acknowledges that certain circumstances
may provide moral justification for secession.' 46 It is essential to
143. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT (1962); BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEMOCRACY 120-124 (1962); WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLIT-
ICAL COALITIONS 102-23 (1962).
144. See generally, LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMEN-
TAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994).
145. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
146. Sunstein, supra note 132, at 654-69.
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define those criteria that state legislatures should apply in review-
ing an appeal for secession by a subunit of an existing municipality.
Such considerations are crucial to the development of fair, intelli-
gent and responsible policy making with regard to an issue that has
great ramifications for state and local governments.
Legitimacy is that property of a political system or regime that
motivates citizens to accept the procedures and the outcomes of
the governmental process. 47 Acceptance implies an understanding
that the system is just and that the benefits of support and partici-
pation outweigh whatever burdens the system may impose. 148 I do
not suggest that legitimacy is an absolute value, or that a loss of it
immediately triggers a justification for secession. Political systems
may have varying degrees of legitimacy. In cases where a govern-
ment does not warrant a high level of support, citizens may re-
spond with a variety of actions. These include passive responses,
such as non-participation in elections, 49 ordinary political activity
designed to defeat incumbent office holders, and radical forms of
action such as revolution. Nevertheless, political legitimacy is com-
prised of factors that warrant examination in order to understand
the motives behind secession.
Weatherford developed a formal model for measuring political
legitimacy.150 He identifies four macro level variables that pertain
to the systemic properties of a government. These include:
1. Accountability. Are rulers accountable to the governed via a
process that allows wide effective participation?
2. Efficiency. Is the government set up to accomplish society's
ends without undue waste of time or resources?
3. Procedural Fairness. Is the system structured to ensure that
issues are resolved in a regular, predictable way and that access
to decisional arenas is open and equal?
4. Distributive Fairness. Are the advantages and costs allocated
by the system distributed equally or else (are) devia-
147. See ROBERT A. DAHL, MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS 31-32 (1963).
148. One of the most extensive discussions on the concept of political legitimacy
appears in DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LiFE 278-310 (1965).
149. There is significant empirical literature in political science that analyzes the
relationship between voter turnout and political alienation. See for example, Paul R.
Abramson & John H. Aldrich, The Decline of Electoral Participation in America, 76
Am. POL. Sci. REV. 502 (1982); Warren E. Miller, Disinterest, Disaffection, and Partic-
ipation in Presidential Politics, 2 POL. BEHAVIOR 7 (1980).
150. M. Stephen Weatherford, Measuring Political Legitimacy, 86 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 149 (1992).
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tions...explicitly justified...in terms of some long run, over-
arching equality principle?15 1
The factors contained in Weatherford's model incorporate the
most essential ingredients of representative democracy.15 2 For ex-
ample, as an individual who pledges support to a government, I
need assurance that I will have a fair opportunity to participate in
public decision making, and I expect my actions to be effective in
advancing my interests. I want my government representatives to
respond to my concerns, to provide me with a fair share of public
goods and services, and to make these rewards available in a cost-
effective way. The distinction between a fair opportunity to par-
ticipate and effective participation in governing is significant, espe-
cially in light of majoritarian politics. As a member of a minority
group, I may have a fair opportunity to let my voice be heard; but
if I regularly find myself in the minority on those issues that are
most important to me, then I may not really have an effective
voice.15
3
Weatherford's criteria are applicable at any level of government,
whether it be local, state, national or international. 54 His model is
of particular utility to us here because it facilitates the analytic
transition from a strictly constitutional and legal realm to a moral
realm. This distinction is not easy for those who understand the
151. Id. at 149. Weatherford also explored a micro level perspective that encom-
passed individual citizen beliefs including, political interest and involvement, beliefs
about interpersonal and social relations relevant to collective action, and optimism
about the responsiveness about the political system. Id. at 150.
152. For an excellent analysis of the concept of political representation and its vary-
ing manifestations, see HANNA F. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967).
See also Heinz Eulau & Paul D. Karps, The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying the
Components of Responsiveness, 2 LEoms. STUD. Q. 233 (1977); Heinz Eulau et al., The
Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund
Burke, 53 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 742 (1959); John A. Fairlie, The Nature of Political
Representation, 34 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 236 (1940).
153. In an essay on voting, Pamela Karlan makes an important distinction between
voting as participation, voting as aggregation and voting as governance. See, Pamela
S. Karlan, The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV.
1705, 1709-20 (1993). See also Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism" The Voting
Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991);
Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413
(1991).
154. Two recent works are relevant to the concept of legitimacy. See ROBERT D.
PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993)
(which analyzes regional government in Italy to find civic communities that are bol-
stered by a high level of trust and volunteerism among the people); ALLAN KORN-
BERG & HAROLD D. CLARKE, CITIZENS AND COMMUNITY: POLITICAL SUPPORT IN A
RESPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1992) (which examines the conditions of political
support in Canada).
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law as the codification of ethical standards. However, it is particu-
larly relevant to this issue on account of the paucity of legal prece-
dents with regard to domestic secession. Even on a global level
where the issue of secession is more prominent, there exists no
body of statutes from which to draw direction. 155 Thus, secession is
more an ethical question than it is a legal one.
B. The Moral Dimension
In assessing the morality of secession, it is useful to examine the
general arguments offered for and against secession in the interna-
tional sphere, and determine their applicability to local govern-
ment in the context of American federalism. Defenses of
separatist motives are generally tied to the properties, or the lack
of, contributing to political legitimacy already discussed. 5 6 The ar-
guments against secession go beyond the constitutional and legal
issues raised above and strike at the core of moral reasoning.
1. Reasons For
The most comprehensive treatment of secession as a moral issue
is presented by Buchanan, whose primary objective is to demon-
strate that separation can be justified under certain conditions. 157
Buchanan finds the absence of a normative theory of secession to
be a major flaw in liberal political philosophy, and contends that,
given the value premises of liberalism, one might assume a basic
sympathy for the right to secede among liberal thinkers. 58
Buchanan's arguments may be classified into three basic catego-
ries: liberalist arguments, equity arguments and a general dissatis-
faction with the status quo.
155. International law is a set of negotiated compacts among sovereign states rather
than an authoritative standard of conduct. See generally L.H.L. OPPENHEIM, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1912); HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1952).
156. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
157. BUCHANAN, supra note 128, at 27-28.
158. Buchanan writes, "[t]he lack of either a normative theory of secession or an
argument to show why one is not needed is especially embarrassing for liberal polit-
ical theory.... The recognition of a right to secede (though not necessarily an unqual-
ified or unconditional right) would seem to be something to which liberalism is at
least prima facie committed. Surely a political philosophy that places a preeminent
value on liberty and self-determination, highly values diversity, and holds that legiti-
mate political authority in some sense rests on the consent of the governed must
either acknowledge a right to secede or supply weighty arguments to show why a
presumption in favor of such a right is rebutted." BUCHANAN, supra note 128, at 4.
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a. Liberalist Arguments.
As noted previously, liberalism is a political philosophy that is
based on individual rights and obligations. Liberalist arguments
constitute those ethical claims that liberal theorists would proffer if
they were inclined to think in terms of group rights. Among the
arguments Buchanan makes that fall under this category are: pro-
tection of liberty, 59 preservation of liberal purity,160 the limited
goals of political association' 6' and consent. 62 All are based on the
notion that participation in a political community is a voluntary
and temporary commitment which, under the assumption of natu-
ral rights, cannot be enforced against the free will of people. Such
claims ring particularly loud at the local level of government be-
cause localities do not enjoy the legal sovereignty that is bestowed
on state and national governments in this federalist system. They
are mere creatures of the state, whose existence arises from the
demands of local communities.
b. Equity Based Arguments
Equity based arguments for secession portray separation as a
form of corrective action. Buchanan lists two such claims: (i) escap-
ing discriminatory redistribution 6 3 and (ii) rectifying past injus-
tices. 164 Let us take them in reverse order. Since secession always
involves a territorial dispute in the international sphere, separatist
actions are often based upon a claim that the territory in question
was originally acquired by unjust means. Although such protests
are conceivable at the local level, they are generally uncommon,
since most incorporation and annexation procedures ensure the
consent of those living within the acquired territory. In both global
159. "If we begin with the general presumption in favor of liberty, it seems to carry
with it a presumption in favor of a right to secede." BUCHANAN, supra note 128, at
29.
160. "The tolerant framework of liberalism allows the growth of communities....
that may eventually shatter the liberal framework, destroying the state-enforced sys-
tem of political and civil rights." BUCHANAN, supra note 128, at 34.
161. "This argument for a right to secede rests upon two assumptions: first, that the
goals for which a political union is forged can be quite specific; and second, that once
these goals are secured, it is permissible for a group to withdraw itself from the polit-
ical union. BUCHANAN, supra note 128, at 35.
162. "[I]f one agrees that consent is a necessary condition for legitimate political
authority, then one must recognize a right to secede." BUCHANAN, supra note 128, at
70.
163. BUCHANAN, supra note 128, at 38-45.
164. BUCHANAN, supra note 128, at 67-70. See also Brilmayer, supra note 123, at
189-191.
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and local contexts, claims of past injustices are more likely to result
from a set of long term official practices that are deemed to be
unresponsive to the needs of the separatist group. The existence of
such long standing grievances are usually symptomatic of a larger
systemic problem that goes to the heart of the legitimacy issue: the
capacity of a group to effectively represent its interests. This prob-
lem may exist even when a group enjoys fair representation. 165
Historical grievances may also involve assertions that the distri-
bution or redistribution of tangible goods and services by the gov-
ernment is unfair. Such a claim requires close scrutiny in order to
be validated as an ethical justification for secession. To begin with,
liberal social theory does not presume an equal allocation of public
resources to all people. To the contrary, liberalism promotes a re-
distributive policy agenda that obliges the more advantaged to help
the disadvantaged.1 66 In order to make a justifiable case for seces-
sion, a group would need to demonstrate either that redistributive
policies constitute a form of economic exploitation, 167 or that the
distribution of public resources they receive is inadequate to meet
their reasonable expectations of government.
c. General Dissatisfaction
Resorting to the marital analogy, Buchanan denies that unfair
treatment is the only justification for a political divorce; general
dissatisfaction with the arrangement should suffice.168 In a practi-
165. Sunstein suggests that a moral claim exists when civil rights or civil liberties
are abridged or denied. However he qualifies the point with the requirement that
normal political channels be exhausted first, before separatist action may ensue. Of
course, he also recognizes that normal political action is not likely to lift the yoke of
an oppressive regime.' Sunstein, supra note 132, at 655-59.
At the state and local level, remedies for the denial of such fundamental rights are
more extensive. American constitutional law is replete with examples where op-
pressed local groups have effectively sought recourse at the state and federal levels to
protect their civil rights. See generally, ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CoNSTrru-
TIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 151-364, 423-479 (1993) (discussing state case
law); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 546-559 (1988) (dis-
cussing federal case law).
166. The most systematic and compelling argument in support of a redistributive
public agenda in the liberal state is found in JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 54-
117, 258-332 (1971). See also BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL
STATE (1980); AMY GUTMANN, LIBERAL EQUALITY (1980).
167. See Sunstein, supra note 132, at 660-61.
168. "Why should one assume that the only justification for divorce is that one's
spouse has wronged one, violated one's rights, treated one unjustly? There might be
other quite respectable reasons to end the union: It is not satisfying the needs or
aspirations for which it was undertaken, one or both parties have changed in funda-
mental ways, and so on." BUCHANAN, supra note 128, at 7.
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cal sense one must ask whether it is worthwhile to perpetuate a
union when it has become unsatisfying or dysfunctional for one or
both of the parties involved. It is a reasonable question at any
level.
Two lines of reasoning fall within this category. The first in-
volves economic efficiency; 169 the second, nationalist notions of
self-determination 170 and cultural identity. The relevance of eco-
nomic efficiency to local government is obvious, but intensifies in
periods of severe fiscal constraint. Particularly in large cities, mu-
nicipalities may be so over-extended that breaking up the munici-
pal unit is a reasonable economic proposition. It may be too big to
operate cost-effectively. Divorce in this context may benefit not
only those who want to leave, but those who remain as well. 17 1
Such claims require careful analysis, but are empirically verifiable.
Self-determination as an expression of cultural or ethnic identity,
while common in the international sphere, 72 is problematic as a
rationale for local separatism. Diversity is a cherished ideal within
the liberal tradition. Given this value premise, one can not make
an ethical case for secession based upon an attempt to create or
preserve a homogeneous community. To do so would promote seg-
regation. In an American context, the issue of cultural identity is
extremely complex, for it provokes tension among a number of
deeply held political. values, including community, self-determina-
tion and diversity.
Notwithstanding the philosophical commitment to diversity that
Americans claim to have, our political and legal history has been
shaped by ambivalence, contradiction and sometimes downright
hypocrisy on the issue.173 Constitutionally, the Supreme Court has
rejected segregation in a number of areas. 74 Conversely, however,
169. BUCHANAN, supra note 128, at 45-48.
170. BUCHANAN, supra note 128, at 48-52.
171. Although Sunstein believes that secession is justifiable on economic grounds,
his assertion is qualified. Any plea for separation based on economic self-interest
must be assessed in terms of its impact on those left behind. If an economically privi-
leged segment of the population set up its own jurisdiction, it could create a hardship
on those left behind. This, under most circumstances, is ethically indefensible. See
Sunstein, supra note 132, at 659-60.
172. These are typical criteria applied in an international context. Buchheit notes,
"criteria of selfness could include elements of a religious, historic, geographic, ethno-
logic, economic, linguistic, and racial character." BUCHHEIT, supra note 122, at 10.
173. See infra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
174. In the landmark desegregation decision, Brown v. Board of Education of To-
peka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court focused on the practice of establishing
separate educational facilities for black and white children. This decision gave mo-
mentum to desegregation of other public facilities. See e.g., New Orleans City Park
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the Supreme Court has upheld the use of racial classifications for
crafting electoral districts.175 The Court has also accepted the use
of community values as a legitimate criterion for local policy mak-
ing, 176 despite the fact that localities have often invoked "commu-
nity standards" to surreptitiously exclude people on the basis of
race and other subjective characteristics. 177 Briffault has soundly
argued how local zoning ordinances in suburban communities have
served as an effective instrument for racial segregation, in the face
of a judicial reluctance to interfere with community prerogatives
on such matters. 178 It is a relevant observation to keep in mind
when considering secession.
As indicated in several recent Supreme Court decisions, race re-
mains an extremely sensitive issue in American law that requires
balanced judgement and is bound to provoke controversy. 179
Whether we like it or not, however, demographic homogeneity is
one factor that tends to matter in the development of community,
be it defined by religion, class, ethnicity or race. This is the great
paradox of a plural society. What the Court seems to be saying is
that there is nothing inherently wrong or illegal with such inclina-
tions, so long as they are not indulged to entertain discriminatory
Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (public parks); Gayle v. Browder,
352 U.S. 903 (1956) (busses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses);
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches).
175. Not only has the Supreme Court allowed racially defined districts under the
provisions of the Voting Rights Act, the Court has actually imposed it as a remedy for
vote dilution and other forms of discrimination at the polls. See e.g., United Jewish
Organizations of Williamsburgh Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
Although in more recent decisions the Court has set stricter standards for the use of
racial criteria in districting, at no point has it absolutely prohibited their use. See e.g.,
Miller v. Johnson, - U.S. -, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 132 L. Ed. 2d 762 (1995); Shaw v. Reno,
-'U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 125 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1993).
176. See e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
177. See NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
PRIVATE VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS (1994); KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRAB-
GRAss FRONTIER (1985); JON TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB: THE POLITICAL FAO-
MENTATION OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA (1979); MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, THE
POLTICS OF EXCLUSION (1976).
178. Briffault, Our Localism, I, supra note 106, at 39-72.
179. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, - U.S. -, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 132 L. Ed.
2d 158 (1995) (requiring the application of strict scrutiny regarding racial classifica-
tions in federal highway contracts); .Missouri v. Jenkins, - U.S. -, 115 S. Ct. 2038,
132 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1995) (discussing racial composition in school districts); Miller, 115
S. Ct. 275; Shaw, 113 S. Ct. 2816.
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purposes.180 There are no easy solutions to how one judges such
matters.
In reviewing a plea for independence by a sub-section of a local
jurisdiction, state legislators must examine secession claims from a
variety of perspectives. The first consideration is whether the
group making the appeal constitutes a legitimate political commu-
nity. As in the international sphere, such factors as a commonality
of history, values, interests and territory are pertinent in making
such a determination, especially when it can be shown that these
features distinguish the group from the remaining population.
While racial, ethnic or religious homogeneity do not provide the
basis for a valid request, neither should they serve as prima facie
cause to dismiss the claim. The appeal becomes problematic in the
face of evidence that it is motivated by a segregationist agenda.
When these suspicions arise, it becomes even more compelling for
secessionists to demonstrate the validity of their broader claims.
2. Arguments Against
Buchheit has delivered among 'the most comprehensive state-
ments against the act of political secession. While he distinguishes
between the legal and extra-legal arguments, it is clear from
Buccheit's presentation that the two categories are closely re-
lated.' 81 After beginning with a presumptive recognition that se-
cession compromises the interests of the sovereign state against
which it is directed,1' 2 he approaches the question from two broad
perspectives. First he examines the impact secession will have on
the parties to the immediate dispute. Second, he examines its ef-
fect upon the larger international community. He offers three ar-
guments: disintegration; trapped minorities; and stranded
majorities.
180. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (holding that discriminatory intent must be shown to hold
a zoning plan unconstitutional).
181. Buchheit takes up the legal considerations first in making a case against seces-
sion. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 122, at 21-27.
182. He writes, "[a]s a general principle, entities blessed with recognition as in-
dependent States by their sister States in the world community are reluctant to permit
part of their population or territory to be removed from their boundaries. Secession
will almost invariably result in a diminution of the unified State's wealth, resources,
and power, thereby lowering its economic stamina, defensive capability, and potential
international influence." Id. at 27.
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a. Disintegration
Referring separately to the "fears" of "balkanization," "indefi-
nite divisibility" and "infirm states," we learn from Buccheit that
the threat of anarchy encountered above in the discussion of con-
stitutionalism 183 may be taken beyond the boarders of a single gov-
ernment.184 Indeed, secession can "result in injury to both the
internal social harmony of these territories and the general interna-
tional order."'1 85 Moreover, if the disintegration of economically
vital states goes unchecked, it may leave the remainder of the in-
ternational community with a severe financial burden.
This example is a corollary to state and local contexts. One can
imagine that successful separation from a municipality might en-
courage similar movements, in the same or nearby jurisdictions. A
string of such events within a short time frame and in the same area
will cause political and economic instability for both the state and
the region. At the local level, however, there is an authoritative
third party available to resolve such disputes. The most effective
safeguard against unbridled domestic governmental disintegration
is responsible decision-making by state legislatures, which would
presumably examine each case on its merits.
.The lessons to be drawn from this consideration are quite appar-
ent. In evaluating a separatist appeal, legislators must consider the
economic viability of the proposed new municipality and the im-
pact of secession on the political and economic stability of the
larger metropolitan region in which it occurs. Ultimately, how-
ever, the legislature must consider the effect on the state, which has
final jurisdiction on the question, and which must bear responsibil-
ity for the ultimate consequences of the action.
b. Trapped Minorities'8 6
Buchheit refers to the situation-not unusual in the interna-
tional arena-where a the group that carries out a successful seces-
sion is a homogeneous population, religiously, racially, ethnically
or culturally.187 His concern in this case is for two types of minori-
ties. First, there is the plight of those members of the separatist
group who are left behind because they live on the outlying area of
183. See supra notes 132-145 and accompanying text.
184. BUCCHEIT, supra note 122, at 28-29.
185. BUCCHEIT, supra note 122, at 28.
186. BUCCHEIT, supra note 122, at 29-30.
187. BUCCHEIT, supra note 122, at 29-30.
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the new state. 88 Then, there are those people living in the new
state who do not share a common identity with the separatist popu-
lation.18 9 Pointing to the Hindus remaining in Pakistan and the
Moslems in India after the division, Buchheit is troubled by the
potential for political oppression. 190 According to the historical
record,' 9' his fears are well founded. Particularly in the wake of a
separatist controversy, those left behind on either side run a risk
that their civil rights will be lost or abridged.
If we were to follow the normative prescription established
above, the threat is less certain in local government. Because sepa-
ratism based on demographic identity would not be tolerated, it is
less probable that secession will result in two homogeneous juris-
dictions. But what if by chance a political divorce does lead to po-
larization? What if, beneath the surface of apparently justifiable
claims for separation, lies a deep seated racial animosity, as was
often the case in annexation and incorporation proceedings?
While, hopefully, such ill-founded motivations surface under
careful legislative scrutiny, this is not guaranteed. It is, therefore,
essential for the legislature to ascertain that provisions have been
made within the new separatist government to accommodate the
needs of minorities. Specific attention must be given to the polit-
ical process adopted by the secessionist government. It is impor-
tant to guarantee that all groups have a fair opportunity to
participate in the electoral process and to achieve representation
within the new government. While such protections are provided
by the federal government under the provisions of the Voting
Rights Act,192 litigation is required to remedy violations. The legis-
lature has a special responsibility to ascertain before the fact that
the situation is not created from the outset.
c. Stranded Majorities93
On an economic rather than political level, adverse circum-
stances are created when a small minority that controls a state's
wealth cuts itself off and sets up a new government. The remaining
majority may find it difficult to support itself, and in the worst of
188. BUCCHEIT, supra note 122, at 29-30.
189. BUCCHEIT, supra note 122, at 29-30.
190. BUCCHEIT, supra note 122, at 29-30.
191. See BUCHANAN, supra note 128, at 16-17. Buchanan discusses the dangers that
arise when a "better off group" secedes from a "worse off group," leaving the "have-
not's" without essential benefits.
192. See, Unapportioned Justice, supra note 142, at 206-214.
193. BUCHHEIT, supra note 122, at 30-31.
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cases can become a burden to the international community. This
problem is similar to that discussed above in relation to disintegra-
tion, 94 only now the focus is on the viability of the original state
and the remnant population. The parallel to a local context is clear
because this situation could arise in domestic as well as interna-
tional contexts.
It is not unusual for secession to be pursued by a relatively pros-
perous part of a community to escape the financial burdens of pro-
viding public goods and services to the poor. 195 In some cases, an
economic motivation for divorce is more justified than others, de-
pending on the severity of the burden imposed upon wealthier citi-
zens. 196 Nevertheless, before separation can be permitted by the
legislature, it must first evaluate what impact the action would have
on the economic livelihood of the original municipality. If severe
economic risk is found, then it may be necessary to explore other
remedies to the unfair economic burdens that exist.
Il. Secession And Local Government: Justifiable Conditions
Secession is a disturbing idea; it is psychologically unsettling, in-
stitutionally disruptive and politically provocative. Nevertheless,
certain conditions may justify it. In its ideal form, secession is a
manifestation of the most fundamental instincts of self-govern-
ment, entirely compatible with the principles upon which Ameri-
can democracy was found. 97 For an existing local government, the
prospect of carving out a new municipality from its territory must
be perceived as a terrifying intrusion of state power, but it is not
inherently unfair. When marshalled by the wrong forces, separa-
tism also provides immeasurable opportunity for political mischief.
Secession is a serious matter requiring deliberate, intelligent, and
objective consideration by the legislature. This section defines the
criteria for assessing local appeals, which will be applied to the case
of Staten Island in Part IV.
194. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
195. According to public choice economists, middle class individuals and families
regularly exercise the exit option through residential mobility in order to avoid tax
burdens imposed because of redistributive fiscal policies in cities. See Charles Tie-
bout, A Pure Theory of Local Government Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956);
James Buchanan, Principles of Fiscal Strategy, 4 PUB. CHOICE 1 (1971).
196. Sunstein makes a distinction between motivations based on pure economic
self-interest, and motivations designed to avoid economic exploitation. While he
finds the latter more justified than the former, he also emphasizes the need to assess
the impact of secession on those who are left behind. See Sunstein, supra, note 132, at
659-660.
197. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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A. Essential Properties
The criteria that state legislators should apply to judge the merits
of secession pleas are based on previously discussed moral consid-
erations. Essential conditions are those conditions that are abso-
lutely required in order to justify an act of separation. Relevant
conditions refer to considerations that are germane to the general
assessment of a situation, but not necessarily essential in order to
make a moral case. We begin with the liberal assumption that self-
governance at the community level is a worthy goal that should be
accommodated, unless it is otherwise proven to undermine the
larger public interest.
1. A Legitimate Community Expresses A Desire For Self-
Government
The first order of business is to determine who might secede.
Recognizing the value of community self-governance is not the
same as promoting a political climate that encourages local frag-
mentation. Secession should not be understood as a normal polit-
ical option for any group or temporary alliance dissatisfied with the
outcome of a particular contest or controversy. 98 The threat of
separation should not be seen as a form of strategic action. 199 In a
practical sense, it should be noted that many political alliaces are
temporary and issue oriented; therefore, they do not provide the
basis for the formation of a community.
Although there are no rigorous standards for defining a legiti-
mate political community, some of the properties accepted in the
international community are useful. Any group that shares a com-
mon territory, history, interest or values might be considered a le-
gitimate political community, so long as this identity is not
projected with the intention of advancing racial, ethnic or religious
segregation. 2°° Because political communities are often built
around homogeneous groups, 20 intent is not always easy to sort
out. This is why separatist appeals must be evaluated according to
the full merits of each case. As is true with incorporation, annexa-
tion and zoning decisions, homogeneity can not be viewed by the
legislature as a proxy for segregationist intent when making the
evaluation.
198. See Holmes, supra note 134.
199. See Sunstein, supra note 132.
200. See BUCHHEIT, supra note 122, at 10.
201. See Brilmayer, supra note 123, at 191-92. See also Sunstein, supra note 132, at
664-66.
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As with incorporation, free choice is an essential ingredient for
the creation of a new government. The referendum is the most
common procedure used for providing citizens with a democratic
instrument to express their sentiments.
2. The Proposed New Municipality Demonstrates Economic
Viability
Creating a government that is unable to support itself is contrary
to the interests of the state and the population of the territory in
question. A judgement on the economic viability of the new mu-
nicipality can be made by assessing such factors as the existing rev-
enue base, the current cost of providing municipal services, the
capacity of the new government to enter the bond market, and the
overall health of the local economy. Given that the territory in
question is part of an existing municipality, there already exists a
revenue flow and service delivery system. on which to base such
estimates. These factors will appear more tangible when reviewing
the Staten Island case.
3. No Significant Adverse Effects Are Anticipated For The
Municipality Against Which The Separatist Action Is
Directed
It is 'assumed that the loss of people, territory and resources by a
municipality would be viewed as a setback for the jurisdiction
against which secession is directed. This is a particularly safe as-
sumption in a situation where it has been determined that the se-
ceding territory is economically viable. The legislature must be
reasonably certain that secession does not seriously compromise
the economic and political stability of the original government
before it can let the action go forward. This would involve a simi-
lar examination of revenues, expenditures and other financial con-
siderations - only this time the analysis is targeted for the original
government.
4. No Significant Adverse Effects Are Anticipated For The
Larger Political Community
The larger political community here contemplates the state gov-
ernment and those local entities existing within the vicinity of the
proposed new municipality, which may be influenced by political
or economic instability in the region. A safeguard against such risk
is the assurance that both the new territory and the original juris-
diction would remain secure after the separation. However, the
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state legislature retains an affirmative obligation to anticipate to
the extent possible, the impact of secession on the general region
beyond the impact on the larger and seceding communities.
5. The Legitimate Interests Of Minorities Are Protected
It is not within the power or responsibility of the state legislature
to resolve the dilemma that a majoritarian form of republicanism
poses for political minorities. However, faced with the prospect of
a jurisdictional division, the legislature must be vigilant in assuring
that minorities on both sides of the divide have a fair opportunity
to represent their interests in the political process. If the architects
of the new government fail to provide for basic civil rights or pro-
cedural safeguards that allow for meaningful political participation,
then it should serve as a warning sign of suspicious intentions be-
hind the move. Because a split might have a substantial impact on
political dynamics in the original jurisdiction, legislators must also
be aware of the need to maintain the same protections there.
B. Relevant Factors
1. The Existence Of Historical Grievances
Although historical grievances may not be a necessary ingredient
for constructing a moral case for secession, it is difficult to find a
separatist movement that is not propelled by such claims.2°2 Cer-
tainly such claims make the case for separation stronger, and they
serve to diffuse or at least rebut, accusations of ill intent that are
hurled against separatists by their opponents.2 °3 Grievances may
focus on the responsiveness of the existing municipality to group
needs, the distribution of resources or services, the distrbution of
financial burdens, and occasionally the abridgement of civil
rights.2° More subtle assertions by minorities might concern their
capacity to have an effective voice in a majoritarian government,
even though procedural safeguards exist to provide for fair
participation.
202. See Brilmayer, supra note 123, at 189-91. Although they are exceptional there
have been cases of secession on the international scene that were pacific. Among the
most notable are the separation of Norway and. Sweden in 1905, the separation of
Senegal from the Mali federation in 1960, the separation of Singapore from the Ma-
laysian federation in 1965, and the separation of Syria from the United Arab Republic
in 1961. BUCHHEIT, supra note 122, at 97-100.
203. Such accusations are typically claims of racial, ethnic or religious segregation.
See BUCHHEIT, supra note 122.
204. As stated above aggrieved groups have recourse through the federal and state
courts to resolve such violations.
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2. The Opportunity For More Efficient Government
This argument becomes more compelling when separation is tied
.to the variable of size. This assertion is that some municipalities
are so large that their cumbersome administrative structures pro-
hibit them from utilizing resources in an efficient way, resulting in a
poor quality of service at higher costs. A body of empirical evi-
dence suggests that when organizations reach a certain size, the
economies of scale realized by early growth reverse and cause dis-
economies.20 5 Such claims must be substantiated on a case by case
basis. The prospect for savings is particularly attractive at a time
when state and local governments are faced with severe financial
constraints. Evidence that separation might serve to improve the
opportunities for more efficient government also decreases its risks
- for the original jurisdiction, for the new municipality, for the state
and even for the region.
Economics aside, one might also argue that a smaller municipal-
ity may provide an opportunity for better governance from a polit-
ical perspective. Perhaps the term efficient is less appropriate in
this context than the term effective. Recalling the Jeffersonian vi-
sion of small local republics, we are directed to an important re-
search literature in political science that examines this very issue
empirically.206 Indeed, one of the great challenges that big govern-
ment poses for democracy is the difficulty of creating political
mechanisms that facilitate meaningful political participation.20 7 We
have already observed that in large cities, activists have attempted
205. Empirical support for the concept of "diseconomies of scale" can be found in
two distinct literatures. Some organizational research indicates that as organizations
grow, a larger portion of their resources becomes absorbed in overhead functions,
decreasing efficiency. See Seymour Melman, The Rise of Administrative Overhead in
Manufacturing Industries in the United States 1899-1947, 3 OXFORD ECON. PAP. 62
(1951); G. E. Hendershot & T. F. James, Size and Growth as Determinants of Admin-
istrative-Production Ratios in Organizations, 37 AM. Soc. REV. 140 (1972); John D.
Kasarda, The Structural Implications of Social System Size: A Three-Level Analysis, 39
AM. Soc. REV. 19 (1974).
Evidence from economics literature is more qualified, suggesting that whether
economies or diseconomies of scale take effect is dependent on the type of service or
organization. See Werner Hirsch, Expenditure Implications of Metropolitan Growth
and Consolidation, 41 REV. ECON. & STAT. 232 (1959); ROBERT BIsH, THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF METROPOLITAN AREAS (1971); Viteritti & Matteo, supra note 109.
206. The most significant comparative study on this subject is ROBERT A. DAHL
AND EDWARD R. TuFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY (1973).
207. Two different and interesting approaches to the problem are JAMES S.
FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC RE-
FORM (1991); BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCARCY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS
FOR A NEW AGE (1984).
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to address this problem with calls for decentralization and commu-
nity government. Although far more drastic and less common, the
division of a municipality into smaller jurisdictions can be under-
stood as a response to the same problem.
IV. Staten Island: As Part Of, And Apart From New York City
A. Profile
If Staten Island attained independence, it would become the sec-
ond largest city in New York State. With a population of nearly
380,000, it is larger than Buffalo and similar in size to cities like
Miami, Pittsburgh, Denver or Minneapolis. Nevertheless, by New
York City standards, it is small, comprising about five percent of
the population.208 Containing a land mass of 60.2 square miles,
Staten Island is an island, at no point attached to the rest of New
York City.209
Although it has been part of New York City for nearly a century,
Staten Island has always been viewed as a remote and distinct
place by its own residents and by other city dwellers. Its original
bridge connections to the rest of the metropolitan region did not
appear until the late nineteen twenties - and these extensions, three
in all, were made to New Jersey, not to New York City.210 Con-
struction of the Verrazano Narrows Bridge that tied the island to
Brooklyn was not completed until 1964. Today the six dollar toll
that one must pay for passage to and from the island remains an
important point of dissention among residents, who perceive it as
tangible evidence of their isolation from the rest of New York
City.211 It costs only four dollars to cross the bridges into New
Jersey, and one can attain free access between all four of the other
boroughs of the city.
One might argue that the long two mile car ride across the Ver-
razano is a stark symbol of the differences that really separate
Staten Island from the rest of New York. Thinking about New
York City, one is struck by images of skyscrapers, busy streets, cor-
208. According to the 1990 census, the population of Staten Island is 378,077; that
of Brooklyn is 2.3 million; Queens, 1.9 million; Manhattan, 1.5 million, and the Bronx,
1.2 million. See Nadia H. Youssef, Changing Population Dynamics on Staten Island:
From Ethnic Homogenity to Diversity, CErrrER FOR MIGRATION STUDIES 3 (1991).
209. Id at 20.
210. The Outerbridge Crossing and the Goethals Bridge were built between Staten
Island and New Jersey in 1928, the Bayonne Bridge was erected in 1931.
211. See Craig Schneider, Secession Won't Cut High Tolls, STATEN ISLAND AD-
VANCE, Aug. 24, 1992, at A13; Sharon Hoey, The Bridges, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE,
May 16, 1993.
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porate headquarters, and an exaggerated version of all that is
grand and all that is despairing about contemporary urban life.
Staten Island is more suburban-like, almost rural in places. 2 12 It is
simply different. It is the only borough in the city that has its own
daily newspaper. The Staten Island Advance, the flagship paper of
the Newhouse publishing conglomerate, outsells all the other dai-
lies combined on the island.213
Today less than half the population of New York City is catego-
rized racially as non-Hispanic white. Eighty percent of Staten Is-
landers fit that category.214 Much of the population is Catholic.
The average family income in New York is $34,360; for Staten Is-
land it is $50,664.215 However, it would be misleading to portray
the place as prosperous. Most of the population is composed of
lower to upper middle class people, who work in service industries
or for government.216 The high income averages are driven up by
the fact that there is relatively little poverty on the island. Approx-
imately 14.8% of New Yorkers receive public assistance, where
only 5.9% of Staten Islanders do.217
The distinct demographics of the island also provide it with its
own mix of politics. By New York City standards, Staten Island is
decidedly more conservative politically. As New York has histori-
cally been considered a Democratic party town, Staten Island is
212. For a recent portrait, see Chip Brown, Escape From New York, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 1994, § 20 (Magazine), at 22; Joseph P. Viteritti, Should Staten Island Leave
the City, 2 CITY JOURNAL 9 (1992). Of its 38,507 acres of land, 5,744 (15%) is park-
land. THE 1993-94 GREEN BOOK: THE OFFICIAL DIRECTORY OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK 604 (1994).
213. According to data made available to the author in 1993 by the Marketing Divi-
sion of Advance Publications, the daily sales for the ADVANCE is approximately
80,000. Those for other daily newspapers are: DAILY NEWS, 22,500; NEW YORK POST,
11,175; NEW YORK TIMES, 8,000. These figures only reflect sales on the island and do
not account for newspapers that are purchased elsewhere by those residents that
commute.
214. Eighty percent of Staten Islanders are classified as non-Hispanic white, as
compared to 43.2% of all New York City residents and 39.1% of those living in the
four other boroughs. The remainder of Staten Island's population is 7.4% black,
8.0% Hispanic, 4.4% Asian and 0.3% other according to the 1990 U.S. Census.
215. The average for the other four boroughs excluding Staten Island is $33,373
according to the 1990 U.S. Census.
216. Approximately 22% of the Staten Island workforce is composed of govern-
ment employees. What if We Vote Yes?, STATEN ISLAND ADVANCE, Oct. 5, 1993, at
A21.
217. For the four other boroughs excluding Staten Island, the rate is 15.3%. These
figures include recipients of Aid for Dependent Children, Home Relief and Supple-
mental Security Income. Information was obtained from the New York City Human
Resources Administration, Public Assistance Data.
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truly bi-partisan.218 Republicans there control the borough presi-
dency, three out of five state legislative seats and two out of three
city council positions. The district attorney is a Democrat. Par-
tisanism has played a role in the political maneuvering behind se-
cession, and it is an easy temptation for those who have not
seriously studied the issue to reduce appeals for separation to a
gross manifestation of white flight.219 However, beyond such sim-
plistic explanations of this phenomenon, there are serious underly-
ing issues of governance.
B. From County To City
1. Inception
The first settlements on Staten Island date back to 1661 when
Dutch and French farmers set up a community on South Beach.220
Four years later the British Governor Richard Nicolls created the
shire of Yorkshire which included Long Island, Westchester and
Staten Island.22' In 1675, "by reason of the Separacon by water,"
the government of Staten Island became self-contained.222 Then,
in 1683 Governor Thomas Dongan, through an act of the first Pro-
vincial Assembly, established the County of Richmond.
It was always a place that had its own mind, remaining sympa-
thetic to the Tories during the American revolution.223 Even Gen-
eral George Washington understood that he could expect little
support in the War of Independence from the people there, who
"after the fairest professions, have shown themselves our most in-
veterate enemies. '224 When the British General William Howe
sailed his fleet through the Narrows in July of 1776, his troops
218. In 1992, 69% of the registered voters in New York City were registered as
Democrats, 14% were Republican and 17% were other. On Staten Island, 48% were
Democrat, 31% were Republican and 21% were other. See THE GREEN BOOK, supra
note 212, at 612-13.
219. See Peter Overby, We're Outta Here: From the Redwood Forest to Staten Is-
land, America Suffers from Separation Anxiety, COMMON CAUSE MAGAZINE, Wmter
1992.
220. The definitive history of Staten Island is CHARLES W. LENG & WILLIAM T.
DAVIS, STATEN ISLAND AND ITS PEOPLE: A HISTORY 1609-1929 (1930). See also IRA
K. MORRIS, MEMORIAL HISTORY OF STATEN ISLAND (1898); RICHARD M. BAYLES,
HISTORY OF RICHMOND CoUNT-rY (1887); JOHN J. CLUTE, ANNALS OF STATEN ISLAND
FROM ITS DISCOVERY TO THE PRESENT TIME (1877).
221. HENRY G. STEINMEYER, STATEN ISLAND 1524-1898, at 22 (1950, rev. 1987).
222. It at 25. At this point the government consisted of a justice, a clerk, a consta-
ble and five overseers. Id. at 24-25.
223. Id at 37.
224. STEINMEYER, supra note 221, at 38.
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found themselves among a friendly population.225 The last rem-
nants of the British army did not leave Staten Island until two
years after Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown in 1781.226
The transition from colony to republic came with relative ease,
because the island already had a functioning county government.
Throughout the nineteenth century, an elaborate system of towns
and villages developed, the end of which saw the loss of its rural
character as factories, breweries and shipyards appeared. 27 As im-
migration began to peak in the middle of the nineteenth century,
the crowded dwellings of Manhattan became a breeding ground for
contagious diseases.228 Remote Staten Island was a convenient lo-
cation to isolate the sick, giving rise to quarantine hospitals in
Tomkinsville, where infectious steerage passengers arriving from
Europe could be deposited. 29
State officials understood by 1870 that Staten Island was not ex-
periencing the same rate of growth enjoyed by Long Island and
Westchester. That year the legislature appointed a commission to
inquire why.230 After nine months of study, the group identified
two major factors: a high incidence of malaria and poor ferry ser-
vice to Manhattan.2 3 1 The first point led to a more rigorous focus
on the need to improve sanitation, sewage and other health related
standards. The latter reflected a growing inclination to foster
closer ties with New York as a route to enhanced economic
vitality.232
2. Consolidation
The movement to consolidate the cities of New York and Brook-
lyn with the towns located in Staten Island, western Queens and
southern Westchester was instigated by businessmen in the re-
gion.233 Real estate, banking and a host of other mercantile inter-
ests were enthusiastic about the prospect of having a single
government control New York harbor and its environs.234 Consoli-
225. Id.
226. Id. at 53.
227. Id at 59, 74.
228. STEINMEYER, supra note 221, at 74.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 90.
231. Id.
232. Id
233. For a description of the forces that led to the movement for consolidation, see
E. HAGMAN HALL, THE SECOND CITY OF THE WORLD (1898); see also ROBERT E.
HAGGER, ET AL., THE RULERS AND THE RULED (1964).
234. STEINMEYER, supra note 221, at 97.
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dation was a sure way for promoting the economic prosperity of
the emerging metropolitan area. Staten Islanders were particularly
receptive, hoping that the powerful financial establishment of New
York City would allow access to economic resources valuable to
developing the sagging infrastructure of the island.235
The first significant step towards consolidation came in 1888
when the New York State Chamber of Commerce put forward a
plan that would become a lifelong obsession of business leader An-
drew H. Green. 36 TWo years later, Green persuaded the State
Legislature to appoint a Greater New York Commission to study
the issue. The panel included six appointees of the Governor, in-
cluding Green, and one appointee each of the mayors of New York
and Brooklyn and the county supervisors of Kings, Queens, West-
chester and Staten Island. 37 Despite strong support in some busi-
ness circles, the process of consolidation would prove to be long
and difficult.238
Civic leaders in New York and Brooklyn, the two largest juris-
dictions affected by the plan, were particularly wary of losing their
independent identities in this large metropolitan experiment.239
Green had failed twice (1892 and 1893) to persuade the State Leg-
islature to pass a bill that would allow an advisory referendum to
be held in the areas affected by the proposed plan.240 Finally the
question was put before the voters in 1894, barely succeeding in
Brooklyn by a margin of 277 ballots.24' The largest measure of
support came from Staten Island, where 79% of the voters ap-
proved the proposal.242
235. STEINMEYER, supra note 221, at 97.
236. For an account of the important role that Green played in the consolidation
cause see ALBERT E. HENSCHEL, MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION: A HISTORICAL
SKETCH OF THE GREATER NEW YORK (1985) and JOHN FOORD, THE LIFE AND PUB-
LIC SERVICES OF ANDREW H. GREEN (1913).
237. DAVID C. HAMMACK, POWER AND SOCIETY: GREATER NEW YORK AT THE
TURN OF THE CENTURY 357 (1982).
238. For an account of the process, see HAMMACK, id. at 186-229; see also ALLAN
NEVINS & JOHN A. KROUT (EDS.), THE GREATER CITY: NEW YORK 1898-1948
(1948).
239. In 1900 the population of New York City was 3,437,202. This was divided as
follows: the Bronx, 200,507; Brooklyn, 1,166,582; Manhattan, 1,850,093; Queens,
152,999; Richmond, 67,021. WALLACE S. SAYRE & HERBERT KAUFMAN, GOV-
ERNING NEW YORK CITY 18 (1960).
240. HAMMACK, supra note 237, at 203-204.
241. HAMMACK, supra note 237, at 204.
242. The outcome of the referendum was: in New York County, 96,938 for, 59,959
against, 9,608 defective; Kings, 64,744-64,467; Queens, 7,712-4,741; Richmond, 5,531-
1,505; Westchester, 374-206; Eastchester, 620-621; Pelham, 251-153. HAMMACK,
supra note 237, at 206.
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The first attempt at passing a consolidation bill failed in the Sen-
ate in 1895, with every senator from New York City and Brooklyn
voting against the measure.243 It took the remarkable efforts of
Republican leader Thomas Platt to get the bill passed on the sec-
ond try.2" Inspired by the considerable patronage that would be-
come available downstate after consolidation, the party boss finally
won the issue over.245 The next stage of the battle involved the
home rule provisions of the State Constitution that was adopted in
1894.
Under the new provisions of a New York State Constitution, any
bill "relating to the property, affairs, or government" of a city re-
quired the approval of that jurisdiction.246 If the bill were not ap-
proved it would have to be resubmitted to the legislature and be
passed by a simple majority of both houses. When the consolida-
tion bill was sent to the mayors of New York City and Brooklyn,
they both rejected it. Nevertheless, even against seemingly over-
whelming odds, Boss Platt's persuasive talents again prevailed and
the bill was passed.
In 1897, the State Legislature overrode another veto by the
mayor of New York City to adopt a charter for Greater New York
that would take effect in 1898.247 In Richmond County the posi-
tions of county treasurer and supervisor were eliminated, as were
the village governments that had been in existence.248 The county
government was preserved, but with only the functions performed
by the county clerk and district attorney.2 49 George Cromwell was
elected as the first Borough President of Staten Island.2
C. Greater New York
1. Structure
The original government of the consolidated city had three prin-
cipal institutions: a bicameral Municipal Assembly; a mayor; and a
243. HAMMACK, supra note 237, at 217.
244. HAMMACK, supra note 237, at 217-223.
245. For a record of Platt's tenure see HAROLD F. GOSNELL, Boss PLArr AND His
NEW YORK MACHINE (1969).
246. N.Y. CONST. OF 1894, art. XII, sec.2 (1894). Under this provision any bill af-
fecting a single city or less than the entire group of cities in one of three classes would
be considered a "special law" requiring approval by the locality(s).
247. 1898 N.Y. Laws 378.
248. STEINMEYER, supra note 221, at 97.
249. STEINMEYER, supra note 221, at 97.
250. STEINMEYER, supra note 221, at 97.
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Board of Estimate and Apportionment.251 While membership in
the lower house of the legislature was determined by population,
the upper house apportioned seats by boroughs. 2  Power in this
government, however was concentrated in the hands of the mayor
who was the chief administrator of the city and who controlled
three out of five seats on the Board of Estimate and Apportion-
ment.25 3 It was the latter body which prepared the city budget and
approved all franchises, debts, taxes and assessments. 54
In 1900, an alliance of Republicans and Brooklyn Democrats
convinced Governor Theodore Roosevelt and the state legislature
to re-consider the charter and wrest control of the city government
from the corrupt Tammany Democrats of Manhattan.255 Thus a
new charter in 1901 allocated a significant amount of authority to
the other boroughs. 256 The most substantial alteration was the
change of membership on the Board of Estimate and Apportion-
ment. Under the new plan, the mayor's two appointees on the
Board were removed, and the five borough presidents were added.
The two other citywide officials remained. Each of the three city-
wide officials were given three votes, the borough presidents of
Manhattan and Brooklyn were given two votes each, and the bor-
ough presidents of Queens and Staten Island were granted one
each.
As a result of the new charter, the borough presidents were also
given a substantial degree of discretion over the construction and
maintenance of public works and the power to enforce the building
251. For a historic overview of charter development in New York City, see Joseph
P. Viteritti, The Tradition of Municipal Reform: Charter Revision in Historical Con-
text, in RESTRUCrURING THE NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT 16 (Frank J. Mauro &
Gerald Benjamin eds., 1989) [hereinafter The Tradition of Municipal Reform].
252. The upper house had twenty-nine members elected in ten districts. There
were five districts in Manhattan, three in Brooklyn and one each in Queens and
Staten Island (the Bronx was still part of New York County at that time). Each dis-
trict in Manhattan and Brooklyn elected three members, and Queens and Staten Is-
land elected two each. The mayor also held one seat. ALFRED R. CONKLING, CITY
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 224-96 (1897). See also FREDERICK SHAW,
HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK CITY LEGISLATURE 4 (1954).
253. The Board consisted of the mayor, his two appointees (the president of the
Department of taxes and Assessments and corporation counsel), and two elected offi-
cials (the comptroller and president of the city council). It took five-sixths a majority
of both houses of the legislature to override a mayoral veto. The mayor also ap-
pointed a city chamberlain (treasurer) and a majority of the Board of Public Improve-
ments, which oversaw public works and planning. CONKLING, supra note 252, at 19-
20.
254. SHAW, supra note 252, at 165.
255. SHAW, supra note 252, at 10-13.
256. 1901 N.Y. Laws 466.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
code. By its third year of operation the government of Greater
New York was reconstituted to accommodate the long standing in-
terests of the counties (now boroughs) that pre-dated
consolidation.
2. The Boroughs
Prior to the adoption of the 1901 charter, the borough presidents
held little sway in New York, except to sit on the Board of Public
Improvements controlled by the mayor and to chair local commu-
nity boards that had no real power.25 7 Charter reforms enacted
throughout the twentieth century had generally enhanced the
power of the mayor, but never to the level of dominance that pre-
vailed under the original charter. Because the city historically had
a weak legislature, the only real rival to executive power was the
Board of Estimate and Apportionment. Thus, the Board was also
a base of leverage for the boroughs.
In 1905, responsibility for preparing the expense budget moved
from the Board to the mayor. Initial preparation of the capital
budget was moved to a newly created City Planning Commission,
whose majority was controlled by the mayor. In 1916 the Board of
Estimate and Apportionment was given authority over zoning,
which made the borough presidents significant players in decisions
involving land use. The Board also retained the authority to ap-
prove the final budgets.
Charter changes made in 1938 and 1961 effectively removed the
executive power that borough presidents enjoyed over city agen-
cies, most notably in the area of public works. The 1961 charter
created a new system of community government,258 which gave the
borough presidents considerable influence over neighborhood
based planning and the monitoring of local services. 59 But the sin-
gle most important source of power for the borough presidents and
their constituencies remained the Board of Estimate, which re-
tained discretion over the budget, land use and city franchises.
257. Although the borough presidents sat on this board, each was only allowed to
vote on projects concerning their respective boroughs. See, The Tradition of Munici-
pal Reform, supra note 251, at 22-27.
258. This system would have been fully implemented in 1975.
259. See CoMMuNITY GOVERNMENT AND THE DECENTRALIZATION OF SERVICES,
supra note 114.
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3. The Board of Estimate
One can trace the ebb and flow of institutional power in and
around New York City by examining the history of the Board of
Estimate.2" The board was originally created in 1864 for the pur-
pose of assessing the costs of the Metropolitan Police District in
New York, Brooklyn, Westchester and Richmond. 6' Its member-
ship included the four police commissioners in the district, all of
whom were appointees of the governor, and the city comptrollers
of New York and Brooklyn.262 Both the board and the district
were part of a larger apparatus through which the Republican
dominated state government exercised control over the city.263 As
early as 1857, the legislature enacted laws that allowed it to appoint
the heads of departments in city government. A state controlled
Board of Health and a Board of Excise had also been established
in 1866.264
After a brief interlude under the first consolidated government
in which the Board of Estimate and Apportionment served as an
instrument for mayoral control, the board became a potent vehicle
for borough representation through the membership of the bor-
ough presidents.265 In 1958, the weighted voting scheme that fa-
vored the larger boroughs of Manhattan and Brooklyn was
changed. Each borough president was given two votes and the
three citywide officials were granted four votes apiece.266 The real-
location of votes especially bolstered the position of tiny Staten
Island, which did not exercise much leverage in a local legislature
apportioned by population, and whose county based political par-
ties were no match for those in the other borodghs in determining
the outcome of mayoral elections. A system of reciprocity had de-
veloped among the borough presidents on the board which allowed
260. This theme is developed in The Tradition of Municipal Reform, supra note 251.
261. See EDWARD DANA DURAND, THE FINANCES OF NEW YORK CITY (1898) (re-
viewing the early history of the Board of Estimate and Apportionment).
262. Id at 253.
263. See JAMES F. RICHARDSON, THE NEW YORK POLICE: COLONIAL TIMES TO
1901 82-164 (1970) (analyzing the important role played by the Metropolitan Police
District in defining state and city relations).
264. SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 239, at 11-12.
265. SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 239, at 638-39.
266. SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 239, at 639. The system was revised again in
1978 when each citywide official, i.e., the mayor, council president, and comptroller,
was given two votes and the borough presidents one apiece. R. Alta Charo, Design-
ing Mathematical Models to Describe One-Person, One-Vote Compliance By Unique
Governmental Structures: The Case of the New York City Board of Estimate, 53 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 735, 737-38 (1985).
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them to trade votes with citywide officials on matters that were of
local interest.
In 1986, the Eastern District of New York ruled that the voting
scheme of the Board of Estimate which granted equal power to the
boroughs violated the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Con-
stitution.267 The decision was subsequently affirmed by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals268 and the United States Supreme
Court.2 69 Noting that the board exercised broad governmental
powers and shared legislative and fiscal powers, the Supreme
Court found that it was required to abide by the one person one
vote standard.27 ° A voting system which allowed Staten Island to
have equal weight with Brooklyn, which had a population that was
five times larger, was not in compliance with the existing Constitu-
tional standard.
D. Seeds of Separatism
1. A New Charter
The momentous Supreme Court ruling required New York City
to restructure its government.Y While there was some considera-
tion given to developing a system of weighted voting to preserve
the board, attorneys advising the Charter Revision Commission ar-
gued against it.272 They claimed that to do so would violate the
267. Morris v. Board of Estimate, 647 F. Supp. 1463 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). Initially the
district court dismissed claims that the Board was subject to the one person one vote
standard, accepting arguments that its members were not elected but appointed by
virtue of their election to other positions. Morris v. Board of Estimate, 551 F. Supp.
652 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). However this determination was rejected by the Second Circuit,
which held that the Board was subject to the Fourteenth Amendment standard, and
remanded the case back to the trial level for a determination of facts. Morris v. Board
of Estimate, 707 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1983).
268. Morris v. Board of Estimate, 831 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1987).
269. Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
270. Id. at 703. On the one person one vote standard, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 567 (1964); Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S.
656 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713
(1964).
271. For a critical review of the process and the results, see Joseph P. Viteritti, The
New Charter: Will it Make a Difference? in URBAN POLMcs NEW YORK STYLE 413
(Jewel Bellush & Dick Netzer eds., 1990) [hereinafter, The New Charter].
272. M. David Gelfand & Terry E. Albritton, Voting Rights and the Board of Esti-
mate: Prospects and Pitfalls, in RESTRUCTURING THE NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT,
supra note 251, at 70; Katherine Butler, An Evaluation of Whether a Weighted Voting
System on the Board of Estimate Would Comply With Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, in VOTING RIGHTS AND THE BOARD OF ESTIMATE: COMPILATION OF ADVISORY
OPINIONS, MEMORANDA CORRESPONDANCE AND RELATED MATERIALS 108 (Frank J.
Mauro ed., 1988).
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provisions of the Voting Rights Act. 73 Although not all attorneys
reviewing the case agreed with this opinion,274 the Commission ul-
timately decided to abolish the Board of Estimate.275 The result
was a new government cast in the classic mold of a mayor-council
system. For the first time in Greater New York's history, the local
legislature did not share its budgetary role with another body, and
it assumed the land use functions once held by the Board. To ac-
commodate the increasingly diverse interests of the city, the size of
the City Council was expanded from 35 to 51 members whose dis-
tricts were defined by a separate districting commission. 76
While the City Council was the principal beneficiary of the new
charter, the borough presidents suffered the greatest losses. Under
the new plan the borough presidents collectively appointed five
members of a thirteen member City Planning Commission, and
each was given discretion over five percent of their borough budg-
ets. This was a poor exchange for the demise of the powerful exec-
utive body which had provided the institutional basis from which
the borough presidents represented their local constituents. Bor-
ough governance, which had been a prominent aspect of New
York's civic culture for nearly a century, simply was not counted as
an important part of the political equation for the framers of the
new government.277
No borough was penalized by the new arrangement as greatly as
Staten Island. Once an equal player in the policy deliberations of
the Board of Estimate, its political needs were now represented by
three members in a fifty-one person legislature. Since the charter
273. For a critical examination of the Voting Rights Act and its enforcement in
local elections, see Unapportioned Justice, supra note 142; CONTROVERSIES IN MINOR-
ITY VOTING: THE VOTING Rioirrs Acr IN PERSPECTIVE (Bernard Grofnian & Chan-
dler Davidson eds., 1992).
274. One prominent attorney involved in the case argued for the preservation of
the Board of Estimate as a form of regionalism. See Edward N. Costikyan, New
York's Board of Estimate: Don't Lose it Without a Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1986, at
A31.
275. Alan Finder, The 1989 Elections: Charter-Putting New Government in Place
Will Take Tune, N.Y. Tim s, Nov. 4,1989, at Bit.
276. For a description of the process undertaken, see Frank J. Macchiarola & Jo-
seph G. Diaz, The 1990 New York City Districting Commission: Renewed Opportunity
for Participation in Local Government or Race-Based Gerrymandering, 14 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1175 (1993); Frank J. Macchiarola & Joseph G. Diaz, Decisionmaking in the
Redistricting Process: Approaching Fairness, 19 J. LEGIs. 199 (1993).
277. One advisor to the Districting Commission actually recommended council
members should be elected at-large by borough through a system of cumulative vot-
ing, but the proposal was never acted upon. See Judith Reed, Of Boroughs, Bounda-
ries and Bullwinkles: The Limitations of Single Member-Districts in a Multiracial
Context, 19 FORDHAM U"e. L.J. 759 (1992).
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amendment, two out of three of these seats have been filled by
Republicans in a legislative body that continues to be dominated
by Democrats. 278
2. Legislative Action
Serious legislative activity promoting secession began as a direct
result of the federal litigation that challenged the constitutionality
of the Board of Estimate. In 1983, Senator John Marchi issued a
Finance Committee report stating Staten Island's legal and finan-
cial capacity to establish itself as an independent city if its repre-
sentation within New York City government were compromised by
the abolition of the Board. 9 Secession bills were introduced in
the Senate and the Assembly during every legislative session be-
tween 1983 and 1989, but passage was not attempted until the
Supreme Court decided the Board of Estimate case in the spring of
1989.280
Meanwhile, political leaders from Staten Island and the other
boroughs joined in urging the Charter Revision Commission to
find a legal remedy that allowed some maintenance of the Board of
Estimate. Until the final passage of the secession legislation Sena-
tor Marchi declared that separation was an act of last resort to a
crisis in governance which denied his small borough an effective
voice in local affairs.81
278. In the present 51 member City Council, there are 45 Democrats and 6 Repub-
licans. THE 1993-94 GREEN BOOK, supra note 212, at 38-41.
279. NEW YORK STATE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE, REMEDIES OF A PROUD
OUTCAST. THE LEGAL PROBABILITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF RESTRUCTURING THE
GOVERNMENT AND BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1983) (report to the
Chairman of the New York State Finance Committee). A second study, AN INOUIRY
INTO SELF-DETERMINATION: STATEN ISLAND COMMITTEE FOR THE REVIEW OF SE-
CESSION (1987), was commissioned by Borough President Ralph Lamberti. The Sen-
ate Finance Committee later commissioned another financial report: BARUCH
COLLEGE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF POLITICAL MANAGEMENT, A STUDY OF THE FEA-
SIBILITY OF AN INDEPENDENT STATEN ISLAND (1990).
280. The bills were sponsored in the assembly by members Elizabeth Connelly,
Robert Straniere and Eric Vitaliano. NEW YORK STATE CHARTER COMMISSION FOR
STATEN ISLAND, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE (1993).
281. "While I was one of the leaders of the secession movement, I made it clear
from the outset that I regarded separation as a measure of last resort. As a lifelong
New York City [Staten Island] resident and a long-time state senator who made two
tries for the mayoralty, I believe my affection for and loyalty to this city is well estab-
lished. It is only when the courts took away our voice in the city government that I
proceeded to move the secession legislation. Throughout the court deliberations, I
had nursed the hope that Staten Island would somehow achieve the equity it deserves.
But it was not to be, at least in the tribunals." Letter from New York State Senator
John J. Marchi, to the Editor of THE NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, Feb. 13, 1991, at 2.
1995] CONDITIONS OF JUSTIFIABLE SECESSION 57
The original bill that passed both houses of the legislature would
have made the 1993 referendum final in determining Staten Is-
land's disengagement. 2 82 However, before putting his signature to
the statute, Governor Cuomo asked for an amendment that would
assign final resolution on the matter to the legislature stating, "it is
reasonable to conclude that separation concerns everybody in this
State and not just Staten Island voters. 283 The governor was une-
quivocal in his belief that Staten Islanders had a right to consider
this question and in his understanding of the governance issue that
generated a plea for independence. Upon signing the legislation he
stated:
The legislature has decided - overwhelmingly on both sides of
the aisle and in both houses - that the people of Staten Island
should have the opportunity to vote on the question whether
they should be allowed to create a new and separate city. It
appears universally accepted that they are justified in wanting to
consider separation from the City of New York. They have been
part of the City since 1898. But a recent decision by the
Supreme Court of the United States dramatically changed
Staten Island's participation in city governance, reducing its
equal vote on the Board of Estimate to a relatively small partici-
pation in a new legislative body. That changed circumstance,
added to a long list of grievances by the people of the island
over the years, moved the legislature to adopt this bill.2 .4
However, not everyone was in agreement with the governor.
Upon signing of the bill, outgoing-Mayor Edward Koch likened the
state legislation to "plunging a dagger into the city's heart. '285 • In-
coming-Mayor David Dinkins immediately announced his opposi-
tion to secession,286 and continued the legal debate initiated by
Koch on the home rule provisions of the State Constitution.. That
discussion is ongoing.287
282. This bill passed by a margin of 58-1 in the Senate, and 117-21 in the Assembly.
283. Executive Memorandum approving L.1989, ch. 773, Dec. 15, 1989, Session
Laws of New York 2438 (McKinney 1989). The final vote was 51-6 in the Senate and
94-36 in the Assembly.
284. Id.
285. Craig Schneider and Carl Campanile, Koch: Island Would Be Better Off Split-
ting From City, But Former Mayor Remains Opposed to Secession, STATEN ISLAND
SUNDAY ADVANCE, August 8, 1993, at A17.
286. Craig Schneider, Mayor Paints Secession as Nightmare for Island, STATEN IS-
LAND ADVANCE, July 29, 1992, at All.
287. See Briffault, supra note 100; Florence L. Cavanna, Note, Home Rule and the
Secession of Staten Island: City of New York v. State of New York, 8 TOURO L. REV.
795 (1992); Underweiser, supra note 100.
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E. The Staten Island Case
1. A Political Community
Staten Island has existed as a political community for more than
three hundred years. Prior to the consolidation of Greater New
York it functioned as an independent county with a burgeoning
system of towns and villages.218 Subsequently, it maintained its
identity as one of five boroughs, which represented its interests
through New York City's powerful Board of Estimate. 8 9 Bor-
oughs, defined by geography and history, have always been an im-
portant part of the political culture of New York.290 Even with the
demise of the Board of Estimate, they remain a part of the political
landscape. Each borough has its own elected president with lim-
ited budgetary prerogatives and the power to appoint members to
important policy making bodies such as the City Planning Commis-
sion, the Board of Education and local community boards.291
Staten Island's distinct identity has been reinforced by its physi-
cal separation from the city, which has made it relatively inaccessi-
ble from the other boroughs. Notwithstanding a century old plan
of consolidation, it is only within the last thirty years that it has
been connected by a bridge. To describe the political community
of Staten Island as insular is more than a metaphor. It is unique in
its bipartisanship, and the more conservative leanings of its voters.
No other borough supports its own daily newspaper.
2. Desire For Self-Government
Staten Islander's have had a number opportunities to consider
self-government. 29 In a referendum held in November 1990, 83%
of the voters elected to perform a study and initiate a process of
secession.293 In February 1992 the Commission hired a consultant
from the City University of New York to conduct a scientific poll of
288. LENG & DAVIS, supra note 220.
289. The Tradition of Municipal Reform, supra note 251.
290. See supra note 251.
291. See supra note 251. These are small remnants of power, given the central role
that the borough presidents played on the Board of Estimate, where they were able to
trade votes with each other and the citywide officials in order to advance constituency
interests. However the retention of these offices speaks to the important role that
boroughs play in defining the political identities of New Yorkers, especially those re-
siding outside of Manhattan. See also The New Charter, supra note 271.
292. REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE, supra note 280 at 4-7.
293. Supra note 280, at 7-8.
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the population.294 Based on a random sample of 750 adult resi-
dents, 58% of those asked said they favored secession (25% were
opposed, 16% were undecided).295 Among those polled, 49%
stated that they would be willing to pay higher taxes as the price
for secession. 96 Between October 1991 and October 1993, the
Charter Commission held twelve public hearings in addition to
monthly open meetings. In November 1993, after two years of
study, deliberation, discussion and debate, 65% of those Staten Is-
landers participating in a second referendum voted to adopt a city
charter drafted by the Commission and secede from New York
City.
3. Economic Viability
Several studies were performed on behalf of the State Charter
Commission in order to make a judgement about whether Staten
Island could support itself as an independent city.2 97 In general,
financial feasibility is determined by a number of key factors: the
revenue generating potential of the community, the anticipated
costs of delivering local services, and the ability of the new city to
enter the bond market. 298 The first two questions were initially ad-
dressed in a report by a group of economists from New York Uni-
versity.299 They found, based on actual receipts for the 1991 fiscal
year, that Staten Island had a revenue base of $955.4 million.300 A
second study, designed to assess the strength of the revenue base,
indicated the overall health of island economy and a rate of growth
exceeding that of the other boroughs. 30 1
294. DouGLAs Muzzio, STATEN ISLANDERS ON SECESSION, A REPORT SUBMIT-
TED TO THE NEW YORK STATE CHARTER COMMISSION FOR STATEN ISLAND (1992).
295. Id. at 1. Among those who expressed an opinion, supporters of secession out-
numbered opponents 70% to 30%. Id.
296. Of those polled, 49% said they would accept a 25% increase in property taxes,
25% said they would accept a 26-50% increase, and 13% would accept a 51-100%
increase. Id. at 2-3.
297. See Joseph P. Viteritti, BRIEFING PAPER: FINANCES, NEW YORK STATE CHAR-
TER COMMISSION FOR STATEN ISLAND (1992) (an overview and synthesis of the major
economic studies) [hereinafter FINANCES].
298. See infra. notes 299-327 and accompanying text.
299. Robert Berne, Dick Netzer and Leanna Stiefel, STATUS Quo FISCAL STUDY:
AN ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK CITY EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES ON STATEN IS-
LAND, REPORT TO THE NEW YORK STATE CHARTER COMMISSION FOR STATEN IS-
LAND (1992).
300. This figure included property taxes, income taxes, commercial taxes, non-tax
revenues and intergovernmental aid. Id. at 39.
301. This report, written by a former senior analyst for the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey, indicated that Staten Island is one of the fastest growing coun-
ties in the metropolitan region, based on population, employment and labor force
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Estimating expenditures was a more complicated task. Based on
actual spending for 1991, it was found that the cost for delivering
local services (municipal and educational) on the island was $670
million. 0 2 While this figure is considerably lower than the reve-
nues received ($955.4 million), it did not include the costs of over-
head functions for New York City or the delivery of local services
that originated in other boroughs. If Staten Island were to assume
a proportional share of these costs under the current service struc-
ture, then total expenditures would be brought to $1.1 billion, re-
sulting in a deficit.30 3 However, there was substantial evidence
from other analyses performed for the Commission indicating that
such an assumption was not valid.3 4
Subsequent studies of select services indicated that Staten Island
could perform these off-island functions at a much lower cost if it
were an independent city.305 A twenty-five city survey of munici-
palities that are similar in size to Staten Island showed that the
average cost for local services was $833.1 billion,3° considerably
lower than the revenue base enjoyed by Staten Island. This report
also highlighted the uniquely broad menu of local services that
Staten Island was providing as part of New York City, suggesting
data. Using data from 1980-1990, the report projected continuing growth through the
year 2010. Hugh O'Neill, THE STATEN ISLAND ECONOMY: PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOP-
MENT IN THE 1990's AND BEYOND, REPORT To THE NEW YORK STATE CHARTER
COMMIISSION FOR STATEN ISLAND (1992).
302. Berne, Netzer & Stiefel, supra note 299, at 28-31.
303. Berne, Netzer & Stiefel, supra note 299, at 28-31.
304. See infra notes 305-07, and accompanying text.
305. The Commission engaged Richard Koehler a professor at the John Jay College
of Criminal Justice, who had previously served as New York City Commissioner of
Corrections and as Chief of Personnel in the New York City Police Department to
conduct studies on the costs of operating a jail, an emergency communications system
and a police academy. These are three major functional areas not physically present
on the island. See Richard J. Koehler & Thomas W. Matteo, JAILS, 911, AND POLICE
TRAINING: REPORTS TO THE NEW YORK STATE CHARTER COMMISSION FOR STATEN
ISLAND (1993).
306. Thomas W. Matteo, STATE OF NEW YORK CHARTER COMMISSION FOR
STATEN ISLAND, SERVICES, EXPENDITURES AND REVENUES: A COMPARISON OF
TWENTY-FIvE CITIES (1992). This survey targeted cities that were within a population
range of 25% higher or lower than Staten Island. The cities included Albuquerque,
Anaheim, Atlanta, Austin, Buffalo, Charlotte, Cincinnati, Denver, Fresno, Fort
Worth, Kansas City, Long Beach, Miami, Minneapolis, Oakland, Omaha, Pittsburgh,
Portland, Sacramento, St. Louis, St. Paul, Toledo, Tucon, Tulsa, and Virginia Beach.
Id. A subsequent calculation added six more cities so that all municipalities in this
population range would be included. These were Colorado Springs, Mesa City, New-
ark, Oklahoma City, Santa Ana City, and Wichita. This brought the average service
cost, including education, down to $783.9 million. Id.
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opportunities for cost savings if the new government chose to func-
tion more like other municipalities in the nation.0 7
Perhaps there is no better indicator of a city's financial viability
than the willingness of the financial community to extend it credit.
In order to assess the capability of a newly incorporated City of
Staten Island to enter the bond market, representatives of the
Commission, including its bond counsel, 08 arranged a meeting with
an Executive Vice President from Moodey's Investor's Service.309
As a major credit rating institution for the City of New York,310
Moodey's analysts were familiar with the revenue potential and
service costs of Staten Island. The firm's analysts were also pro-
vided access to the financial reports that had been performed for
the Commission. Although a formal credit rating was not possible
for a hypothetical city, an informal assessment indicated that a City
of Staten Island would be credit worthy, and suggested that it
might even merit a rating higher than New York City because of its
more modest service needs.31'
As a result of the various financial studies that were performed,
a sub-committee of the Commission found that the establishment
of a separate City of Staten Island was financially feasible a.31 This
conclusion was accepted by a separate statutory panel established
by the state legislature and the governor,13 and was unanimously
endorsed by the full membership of the Commission.31 4
4. Impact on New York City
Severing Staten Island from New York would mean the loss of
population, land, revenues and infrastructure for the latter.315 It
would require New York to restructure its government and re-draw
the lines of its councilmanic districts.316 These are substantial
307. Id
308. The Commission retained John J. Keohane of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe.
309. MEMORANDUM FROM JOHN J. KEOHANE TO THE STATE OF NEW YORK CHAR-
TER COMMISSION FOR STATEN ISLAND WORKING GROUP ON FINANCE 1 (Mar. 25,
1993) (on file with the FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL) [hereinafter, WORKING
GROUP].
310. Id
311. Id. at 2.
312. NEW YORK STATE CHARTER COMMISSION FOR STATEN ISLAND, STATEMENT
OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE BUDGET (1993).
313. NEW YORK STATE CHARTER COMMISSION FOR STATEN ISLAND, REPORT OF
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TAX AND FINANCE 4 (1993).
314. NEW YORK STATE CHARTER COMMISSION FOR STATEN ISLAND, REPORT TO
THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE (1993).
315. See supra notes 87-89.
316. See supra note 90.
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changes. However they do not pose any apparent threat to the
viability or stability of New York. On the financial side, Staten
Island is too small to constitute a significant loss for New York. If
the city were to lose all the revenues which flow from Staten Island
($955.4 million including intergovernmental aid), and save only on
those expenses that are derived from direct on-island services
($670 million), New York would suffer a net operating loss of
$285.4 million per year.317 This is a rather absurd assumption, how-
ever, because the city would save some overhead costs and ex-
penses incurred from providing services that originate in other
boroughs. Nevertheless, if it were true, the net operating losses
realized would amount to less than 1% of the city budget,318 hardly
enough to set New York on the route to financial calamity.
In the course of its deliberations, the Commission received two
legal opinions from private counsel which held that subsequent to
separation, the City of Staten Island would be held liable for a por-
tion of the New York City debt that was incurred prior to the di-
vorce.31 9 The Commission built this assumption into its financial
analyses and projections for the prospective new city. The legisla-
tion proposed by the Commission (and passed by the Senate) in-
cludes a provision that the City of Staten Island would assume a
portion of the New York debt.32 ° In accord with recommendations
made by the Commission's bond counsel, the proposed legislation
imposes joint and several liability on Staten Island and New York
for debt incurred prior to separation; and this debt is allocated in
proportion to assessed valuation between Staten Island and the re-
maining four boroughs.3 1
5. Impact on State and Region
The effect that Staten Island secession will have on the state and
region is largely a function of its own economic viability, and the
impact that the divorce will have on New York City. Staten Island
presents us with one of those rare cases where an economically
317. FINANCES, supra note 297.
318. FINANCES, supra note 297, at 18.
319. John Keohane, for Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, REPORT ON CERTAIN MAT-
TERS WITH RESPECT TO INDEBTEDNESS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INDEPENDENT CITY
OF STATEN ISLAND 4 (undated) [hereinafter, INDEBTEDNESS]; Roger Furman & Ron-
ald A. Jackson, for Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hayes & Handler, MEMORANDUM ON
CONTINUING LEGAL OBLIGATIONS, 31-32 (1993) (both prepared for the New York
State Charter Commission for Staten Island).
320. See supra note 17.
321. INDEBTEDNESS, supra note 319.
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viable territory can separate from an existing municipality without
posing a serious financial threat to the remaining city.322 Therefore
secession does not seem to represent a risk either to the state or
the region. The action will result, it is expected, with the existence
of two relatively large and robust cities in the metropolitan region.
Whether the departure of Staten Island would instigate further
separatism within New York is speculative. Certainly such de-
mands have already been heard in the borough of Queens. A bill
was passed in the State Senate in April, 1992 that would allow
Queens to initiate a similar process of study, followed by a referen-
dum.323 Nevertheless, it remains to be proven that Queens has the
resources to support itself as an independent city. If such a case
were to actually materialize, which is unlikely, then the legislature
would have to consider it on the merits and make a judgement re-
garding its potential impact on the city, state and region. At this
point in time, the only other borough that clearly has the capability
to support itself is Manhattan. But the prospect of Manhattan's
separating would represent such a serious financial threat to the
remainder of the city, that it would be disallowed under the stan-
dards developed in this Article. Thus, there is no reason to expect
that the separation of Staten Island will lead to the disintegration
of New York City or the destabilization of the region.
6. Minority Interests
Secession has been opposed by the organized black community
of Staten Island.324 Many black leaders feel that their interests
would be better accommodated in a consolidated city where racial
minorities constitute a majority of the city population. Black and
Hispanic politicians in the other boroughs, however, have been re-
ceptive to the idea.325 Many of the latter express a basic sympathy
with the idea of self-determination, while others pragmatically
proclaim that the loss of predominantly white Staten Island will
bolster the political fortunes of minority office seekers citywide.326
The future of secession should not be determined by the political
322. See supra note 297.
323. The bill has been given little hope of passing through the Assembly. Thus, it is
unlikely at this time that Queens' secession will be studied seriously. Kevin Sack,
State Senate Passes Bill to Allow Queens to Begin Secession Effort, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr.
29, 1992, at B4.
1324. Craig Schneider & Carl Campanile, NAACP Opposes Secession, STATEN IS-
LAND ADVANCE, Oct. 27, 1993, at A15.
325. Black Pols Rethinking Secession, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Nov. 26, 1993.
326. Id
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fortunes of any group or party. However, there is a need to assure
that the rights of all groups are protected, and that minorities have
a fair opportunity to participate in the political process after
secession.
If Staten Island were to become an independent city, its resi-
dents would be afforded the same constitutional protections by the
New York State and federal Constitutions that they currently have
in the larger city. The issue here is to create a local political pro-
cess that provides a small minority population with access, voice
and representation at the new city hall. The State Charter Com-
mission was both diligent and creative in exploring a variety of gov-
ernance options that would allow the minority community to
maximize its influence in the local political process. For example,
while the original inclination of the Commission was to create a
city manager form of government to improve efficiency, that pro-
posal was eventually dropped in favor of a mayor-council system in
order to achieve better representation for minorities.327 The Com-
mission was especially innovative in the creation of a new school
district, where in order to respond to minority concerns, it chose a
method of school board elections utilizing cumulative voting.328
Both the city council and school board plans were arrived at after
consultation with attorneys in the United States Department of
Justice.329
7. Grievances
It is clear from the pronouncements of Senator Marchi when
proposing the original secession legislation,330 of Governor Cuomo
327. A staff report indicated that the adoption of a city manager system with a
small legislative body would make it difficult to create a minority district in a city with
a small black and Hispanic community. As an alternative the Commission, in its pro-
posed city charter, chose to set up a mayor-council system with 15 legislative districts.
This would make it possible to carve out at least one, or possibly two, minority dis-
tricts. See Barbara Lawrence, BRIEFING PAPER: FORMS OF GOVERNMENT AT THE
LOCAL LEVEL, NEw YORK STATE CHARTER COMMISSION FOR STATEN ISLAND (Dec.
6, 1991).
328. This recommendation was the result of a comprehensive staff report that had
examined a variety of alternative and the social science literature that reviewed the
advantages and disadvantages of the options. In the process of the study, the staff had
consulted with a number of nationally recognized experts on the subject. See Nat
Cipollina and Barbara Lawrence, BRIEFING PAPER: THE SCHOOL BOARD ELECTION
PROCESS, NEW YORK STATE CHARTER COMMISSION FOR STATEN ISLAND (March 30,
1993).
329. See id. at 21.
330. See supra note 281.
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when signing it,331 and in the preamble to the recent legislation
passed by the State Senate,332 that the driving force behind the
move was the elimination of the Board of Estimate. This is not a
historic grievance, because it only emerged in response to a deci-
sion by a federal appellate court in 1983.333 Nor has it been put
forward as a denial of civil rights. For Staten Islanders, the key
issue seems to be one of effective representation in a majoritarian
system where they perceive themselves as a distinct minority.3 4
For them, the only route to meaningful home rule is independence.
The case is a classic manifestation of what was referred to above as
the dilemma of majoritarian democracy.335
In addition to the crisis in governance that accompanied charter
reform, Staten Islanders harbor some historic grievances against
New York City. Paramount among these is the existence of an
open landfill at Fresh Kills, where the city disposes of 10,000 tons
of solid waste daily.336 This is a longstanding issue for residents.
The first secession bill was submitted to the legislature in 1947 by
Assemblyman Edmund Radigan to protest the opening of the gar-
bage dump.337 Since 1960, the City of New York has closed eleven
such facilities throughout the boroughs, with only this one remain-
ing.338 In his report to the Commission, pollster Muzzio com-
mented, "Staten Islanders feel 'dumped on' both figuratively and
literally. '339 He added, "Fresh Kills appears to be both a tangible
example and potent symbol of Staten Islander's disaffection. ''340
331. See supra note 283.
332. The legislative findings of the bill read: "the New York State constitution enti-
tles the people of Staten Island to 'effective local self-government'.. . . the existing
charter of the city of New York does not provide meaningful representation to the
borough of Staten Island.... given the constraints of the Supreme Court articulated
in Board of Estimate v. Morris, the only viable alternative to providing 'effective local
self-government' is legal disengagement from the city of New York and the creation
of the new city of Staten Island." Supra note 17, at 3.
333. Supra note 267.
334. In the poll taken on the island, 84% stated that their interests were not ade-
quately represented in city government, and 41% felt that the elimination of the
Board of Estimate made the city less responsive to the island's needs. Muzzio, supra
note 294.
335. See supra notes 139-40.
336. Among those polled, the landfill was the most frequently cited problem facing
the island, with 21%. listing it first, and 10% listing it second. Muzzio, supra note
294, at 7.
337. S. 3781, supra note 17.
338. See REPORT To THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE, NEW YORK STATE
CHARTER COMMISSION FOR STATEN ISLAND, at 5-6 (1992).
339. Id. at 7.
340. Id. at 18.
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Among the other grievances observed by Muzzio is that Staten
Islanders feel "neglected" and "abused," seeing themselves as pay-
ing more than their fair share of taxes, and receiving less than an
equitable share of services.34' Such citizen perceptions might be
found in many parts of New York City, and they are certainly con-
testable. However, in addition to the landfill, there are certain his-
toric claims that island residents can validly list in making a case
for unique treatment by the municipal government. Transportation
has always been a problem. Not only is it difficult and expensive to
travel between the other boroughs and the island,342 Staten Island,
with its large land mass, is the only borough without a subway sys-
tem for internal travel. Likewise Staten Island is the only borough
without a primary care public hospital; and many homes on its
south shore are still without sewers.
8. Legitimacy
Underlying reasonable assertions that New York is institution-
ally incapable of effectively representing the needs of Staten Is-
landers, and some tangible evidence of managerial inefficiencies
that are indigenous to the nation's largest municipality, there is the
basic problem of public confidence. If ever there were an institu-
tional structure that epitomized the diseconomy and impersonality
of scale, it is the government bureaucracy of New York. Staten
Islanders do not exhibit much faith in New York or its future, and
feel that they have more to look forward to if they go it alone.343
Perhaps the point is best made from the positive side, in terms of
what Staten Islanders aspire to in appealing for independence.
This sentiment is best stated in the preamble to the proposed city
charter, written personally by Senator John Marchi:
We consent to be governed by the new municipality in the belief
that smaller, localized city government may effectively and
responsibly balance the needs of the people with the cost of pro-
viding municipal service.344
341. Of those polled, 72% claim that they pay more than their fair share of taxes,
and 80% claim they do not get an equitable share of services. Id. at 4.
342. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
343. "Staten Islanders do not have much confidence in New York City government.
Nearly half (48%) have no confidence; the other half (49%) have some. They are
pessimistic about the future of New York (68% believe New York will be a worse
place to live in five years) and Staten Island's place in it (55% say Staten Island will
be worse five years hence if it stays part of New York City). They see a rosier picture
in an independent Staten Island (60% see a better Staten Island in five years if it
succeeds)." Muzzio, supra note 294.
344. S. 3781, supra note 17, at 5.
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9. Summary
By the standards developed in this paper, Staten Island has a
justifiable claim to secede from New York City. It is a legitimate
political community defined by geography, history and values that
distinguish it from the rest of New York. It has expressed a strong
desire for self-government. Although it has the economic means to
support itself, separation from New York will not jeopardize the
stability of the latter. Therefore, secession will not pose any seri-
ous risks for the state or the region. The framers of its proposed
government have been vigilant in protecting the legitimate inter-
ests of minorities within the jurisdiction of the new city. While
such institutional safeguards can never be expected to resolve the
dilemma faced by minorities in a majoritarian system, they should
provide minorities with a fair opportunity for access, participation
and representation. Staten Islanders have articulated many griev-
ances against the government of New York City, but.their major
concern is a lack of effective representation resulting from the de-
mise of the Board of Estimate. In the final analysis, Staten Island-
ers lack confidence in the government and future of New York
City, and are more inclined to provide support and legitimacy to a
smaller more proximate government of their own making.
Conclusion
A political debate has ensued in New York that pits the home
rule doctrine against an attempt at municipal secession. The ab-
surdity of the controversy is underscored by the fact that, as polit-
ical concepts, both home rule and secession are derived from the
same yearning for local self-government - a cherished value within
the American political tradition, but not an absolute ri.ght. Our
localism, bereft of constitutional standing, is one that is modified
and moderated by state government. Based on Dillon's Rule,
there is a rich body of case law that subjects home rule to the ple-
nary power of the legislature. There are no such legal guidelines
regarding municipal secession. Nevertheless, given the severity of
separatist claims and the impact they can have on a city, a region or
a state, there is a need to develop standards for reviewing such
appeals. Because it is the state that must bear the consequences of
a political divorce locally, the state, through the power of the legis-
lature, must judge the appeal.
The literature on international jurisprudence provides us with
the material for defining criteria to determine the conditions under
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which municipal secession can be morally justified. When applied
in the context of American federalism, guided by the principles of
liberal democracy, these criteria support the notion of community
self-determination at the local level, so long as it does not jeopard-
ize the larger public good, and the legitimate interests of concerned
minorities are protected. These standards are put forth with the
full knowledge and understanding that big city politics and bureau-
cracy are as much a threat to meaningful community government
as is the aggressive exercise of power at the state level. These stan-
dards have general applicability to other American cities. If the
New York State legislature were to apply them to the case made by
Staten Islanders, it would support their plea for self-government.
